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PREFACE 
This thesis analyzes United States diplomatic relations with the 
ten South American republics from December 7, 1941, to November S, 1942s 
Both of these dates are significant., The first marks the Japanese 
attack upon Pearl Harbors The near destruction. of the Pacific Fleet 
brought the United States into the war at a time when Japan was pushing 
south toward Australia and the German forces were moving toward the Suez 
Canal in North Africa and toward the Russian heartland on the Eastern 
Front. The tide was indeed with the Axis powerse During 1942, however, 
the flow began to recede with Allied victories at Midway Island, the 
Coral Sea, El Alamein, Stalingrad, and in the Battle of the Atlantic., 
As part of the overall ebbing of the tide, the waters of Axis danger 
began to withdraw from South America on November S, 1942, when the 
Allied invasion of North Africa terminated the possibility of a German 
invasion of the Western Hemisphere from Africa., The eleven months pre~ 
ceding this invasion were thus the most critical period for South 
America during the waro This thesis attempts to determine how the 
United States obtained the cooperation of the South American govern-
ments during these desperate months., 
The answer to this question is that the United States employed its 
economic might to obtain the political, defensive, and economic coopera-
tion of its southern neighbors., To the United States, political unity 
of the Western Hemisphere meant that all twenty-one American republics 
would forego neutrality and sever diplomatic relations with Germany, 
iii 
Japan, and Italye After the United States offered financial rewards 
at the Foreign Ministers Conference held in Rio de Janeiro, all of the 
South American countries, except Argentina and Chile, broke relationse 
Following the Rio conference, the United States offered rewards and 
applied sanctions to Argentina and Chile to persuade them to break 
relationso Despite these efforts, the governments of Buenos Aires and 
Santiago still maintained their diplomatic ties with the Axis powers 
as the Allied armies established beachheads on the coast of North 
Africa. From the eight governments that had severed relations, the 
United States secured defensive cooperation through the offers of Lend-
Lease aid. Finally, the United States brought the South American 
countries into an economic collaboration which increased the economic 
dependency of the South American countries upon the United Stateso Any 
hesitation to accept this new status was removed through the United 
States offers of immediate financial rewardse Since economic coercion 
was the means the United States employed in the desperate days from 
December 7, 1941, to November 8, 1942, the 'all for one' concept of the 
Good Neighbor Policy fails to explain adequately the roochanics of 
co ope rat ion o 
I want to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for the 
assistance and guidance so generously given meo I am deeply indebted 
to Professor John Ae Sylvester for his counsel, patience, interest, and 
encouragemente Professor Michael M. Smith gave generously of his time 
in carefully reading the manuscript and making many appreciated sug-
gestionsq I would like to acknowledge the faculty of the History 
Department of Oklahoma State University under the chairmanship of 
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into historical methodology. Finally, I am grateful to my parents, 
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CHAPTER I 
POLITICAL COOPERATION: THE AFrEBMATH OF PEAfil. HA.RBOR 
Finishing a leisurely Sunday dinner on December 7, 1941, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt munched on an apple from the tray of food sitting 
on his desk in the Oval Office of the White House. The abrupt ringing 
of the presidential telephone at 1;47 p.m. interrupted the relaxed 
conversation he was enjoying with his close friend and advisor, Harry 
Hopkins. From the other end of the telephone connection, Secretary of 
the Navy Frank Knox informed the President that the Navy had intercepted 
from Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) a terse alert message: 
"Air raid on Pearl Harbor. 111 After a brief conversation with Knox 
about the immediate steps the Navy Department should take, Roosevelt 
telephoned Secretary of State Cordell Hull at 2:05 to inform him of the 
awesome newsG In calm anger, Secretary Hull received two waiting 
Japanese diplomats and their written rejection of the proposal the 
United States had earlier offered to solve the problems between the two 
countries. 
The pace began to accelerate. A little less than an hour later, 
Cordell Hull arrived at the White House to discuss wartime measures 
with the President and other high-ranking administration officials, 
including Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, The subjects covered 
1Forrest Davis and Ernest K, Lindley, !!2!!. War Came (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1942), PP• 3-6. 
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a wide rarige, such as immediate steps for defending the United States, 
the prospectei !or mobilizing a vast army, the need for increasing arma-
ment production, and the complexity of formuJ,.ating diplomatic relations 
wj,th probable al.lies, Amidst these discussions, the question also 
emerged of what course should the United States follow with the ten 
South American countries to which it professed to be a 'good neighbor.• 2 
In 1942, Cordell Hl.lll loftily summarized this Good Neighbor Policy 
as resting upon the "solid foundation of law, justice, non .... int.liJrvention, 
non-aggression and international collaboration ••• in political, 
~conomic, social, moral, and intellectual relat;ions among nations. 113 
This concept of the Un~ted States as a good neighbor had gradually 
evolved from its opposite, that is the domination and military occupa-
tionof various Caribbean and Cent:r;-al American republics by the Coloso 
del Norte in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Although 
-
the North American nrl,litary fist had not reaeh~d South America, its 
domineering image was ever present. During the ensuing years, the 
United States gradually withdrew its troops from Central America and 
extended the open hand o;f friendship to all of its southern: neighbors. 
Hence, by the mid-l9.30's, the United States was following its proclaimed 
2cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull ( 2 vols,; New York: 
Macmillan and Co., 1948), II, io95' .... 1097. -
3u. s. , Department of State, Department Qf State Bulletin, Vol. 
III, no. 161 (July 25, 1942), 649. ' · · 
3 
policy of good neighborliness.4 
The United States had laid the cornerstone of this policy when it 
signed the declaration of the Inter-American Conference for the Main-
tenance of Peace at Buenos Aires in 1936 and disavowed "intervention 
•• o , directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal 
or external affairs of any other [American republic]. 11 5 With this 
foundation, the United States expanded its friendship into the triangle 
of political collaboration, economic cooperation, and social and 
cultural interchange. Believing in the ideal of solidarity of the 
Western Hemisphere, the United States took part in the periodical 
inter-American conferences of the twentieth century as well as the 
pennanent commissions established at these conferences. Besides re-
fusing to intervene in the Latin American countries to protect United 
States investments, the North American nation advanced money to these 
countries and negotiated trade-encouraging reciprocal tariff reductions. 
As the third point of this triangle, the United States encouraged 
cultural interaction among the peoples of the Americas through a 
variety of programs, including exchange visits, radio broadcasts into 
the other Americas, inter-cultural libraries throughout the Western 
4Historiographical disagreement exists over the nature of the 
origins of the Good Neighbor Policy. For example, Alexander DeConde 
maintains that Herbert Hoover originated the change in hemispheric re-
lations. In contradiction, Donald Dozer contends that Franklin Roose-
velt was the creator. Samuel Flagg Bemis, however, traces the roots to 
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes in 1921.. DeConde, Herbert 
Hoover's Foreign,Policy (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 
1951), pp. 123-lZ?; Dozer, Are ~ Good Neighbors? (Gainesville, Flao: 
University of Florida Press, 1959), PP• lb-37; Bemis, The Latin Ameri-
™ )olicy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 
1943 ' po 389. 
5u .s., Department of State, Revort of the Dele~ation of the United 
States of America to the Inter-American Con1e'renceor the Maintenance 
of Peac8," Conference series No. 33 (1937), P• 127. - -
4 
Hemisphere, and dissemination of cultural information. 6 As the attack 
upon Pearl Harbor thrust the United States into a world war with Japan 
and the Tripartite Powers, the Good Neighbor Policy began its severest 
test: could it endure and maintain hemispheric unity? 
From the attack upon the Pacific fleet stationed in Hawaii on 
December?, 1941, to the invasion of North Africa by the United States 
and the Allied armies on November 8, 1942, the possibility existed that 
the Axis would launch an invasion of South America from Dakar on the 
west coast of Africa. More than a year before the United States entered 
the war, Nazi Germany had already forced France into submission by 
placing much of the country under military occupation and by establishing 
a puppet government at Vichy over the unoccupied portion. Through its 
power over France, the Axis had a strong influence upon the colony of 
French West Africa on the extreme western point of the African conti-
nent. Less than two thousand miles from the South American continent, 
this French colony was the closest point in either Europe or Asia to 
any of the American republics. The Allied armies' successful invasion 
of North Africa, however, thwarted any desire the Axis may have had to 
move troops and equipment to Dakar for an invasion of the Western 
Hemisphere.7 
During the eleven months between December?, 1941, and November 8, 
6Bemis, Latin American Policy, pp. 295, 328, 332. 
7several secondary works mention the possibility of an attack from 
French West Africa: Bryce Oliver, "Brazil and Uruguay," in What the 
South Americans Think of !:!§. (New York: Robert M. McBride and Co., 1945), 
p. 148; J. Lloyd Me.cham, The United States ~ Inter-American Security, 
18$9-1960 (Austin, Tex.~ The University of Texas Press, 1961), Po 217; 
E. 0. Guerrant' Roosevelt Is ~ Nei,hbor Policy (Albuquerque' Ne Mo~ 
University of New Mexico Press, 1950 , p. 185. 
5 
1942, the United States had the cooperation of at least eight of the ten 
South American republics. Although Samuel Flagg Bemis, an eminent 
historian of United States relations with its southern neighbors, main-
tained that this cooperation "showed conclusively that all the Latin 
American republics really regarded the United States as a good neighbor," 
the collaboration among the American republics did not result entirely 
from the friendship which the Latin Americans had for the United States 
and its newly developed policy.8 For by using its economic power as 
both a 'carrot and a stick,' the United States modified its stated Good 
Neighbor Policy to secure the political, defensive, and economic co-
operation of the ten South American republics--Argentina, Brazil, 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Vene-
zuela. 
Eight hours after he had received the news of Pearl Harbor, 
Secretary of State Hull dispatched to the North American diplomats in 
the Latin American countries a circular telegram which began the war-
time implementation of the Good Neighbor Policyo According to the in-
structions, each United States representative was to obtain the views 
of the particular country to which he was accredited regarding the 
"acts of unprovoked aggression Q o • in light of the existing inter-
American agreements and relationships .. 119 The immediate reactions from 
the southern lands were pledges to fulfill their inter-American obliga-
tionso Even before the arrival of Hull's telegram in Lima, Perues 
8Bemis, Latin American Policy, P• 3730 
9u .,So, Department of State, Pate rs Relating to the Foreign Re-
lations of the United States, :h2£. Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1963},"' VI, 550 Hereafter cited as Foreign Relations., 
President Manuel Prado Ugarteche dispatched a letter to President 
Roosevelt expressing solidarity with the United States.10 On the 
~.s 0f Peru's commitment, similar pronouncements came from Brazil, 
Ecuador, and Argentina on December 8, from Bolivia, Uruguay, and Vene-
11 
zueJ,.a on December 9, and from Chile and Paraguay on December 10. 
The Colombian government took the more drastic step of severing diplo-
t . 1 t• "th J De ib 8 t "t l"d •t 12 ma ic re a ions wi · apan on cem er o express i s so i ari y. 
Eight SOM.th American governments - Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,. 
Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela - also specifically 
6 
announced that they would not consider the United States as a belliger-
ent under their neutrality laws.13 Within three days of the Japanese 
attackt the United States had pledges of support and hemispheric unity. 
The promises, however, were just words; the United States had to change 
these words into effective actions that would protect the security of 
the hemisphere. 
Many of these expressions of cooperation, however, did not flow 
from a simple Latin American desire for American unity and friendshipo 
While many Latin Americans were truly shocked by the treachery of the 
surprise attack in the Pacific, Charge' Allan Dawson in La Paz stated 
that the feeling of the government of Enrique Penaranda del Castillo 
was "based largely on the fact of Bolivian economic dependence on the 
lOibid., P• 109. 
11Ibido, for Brazil seep. 73, for Ecuador see P• 89, for Argen-
tina see P• 58, for Bolivia see p. 72, for Uruguay see P• 113, for Vene-
zuela see p., 115, for Chile see P• 76,. and for Paraguay see pp. 107-109. 
12Ibid,, p., 80. 
13Ibid~, f~r A~gentina ~ee p. 62, for Bolivia see P• 72, for Chile 
see p. 76, for Colombia see pp. 82-83, for Paraguay see p. 108, for Peru 
see p. 110, for Uruguay see.' p. 113, and for Venezuela see P• 115. 
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United States. 1114 Cordell Hull, later recounting the immediate South 
American reactions, concurred with Dawson. Explaining how the United 
States relations "with the Latin American Republics during 1941 had 
intensified in various directions," the Secretary of State specifically 
mentioned military aid, Export-Import Bank loans, and reciprocal trade 
agreements.15 During the days immediately after Pearl Harbor, the South 
American governments expressed certain self-seeking desires which 
dulled any altruistic image. The Ecuadorian government of President 
Carlos A. Arroyo del R!O asked for a defense agreement guaranteeing the 
secu~ity of Ecuador's Galapagos Islands, a nearly uninhabited archi-
pelago lying about six hundred miles off its coast.16 While the Peru-
via.11 government wanted assurance that the United States shipping services 
would continue,17 Uruguay's President Alfredo Baldomir just wanted 
ships.18 Chile's foreign minister, Juan Bautista Rossetti, audaciously 
proposed that the United States sign a secret protocol predated to 
October, 1941, to protect the exposed 2,600-mile coastline of Chile. 
In rejecting this proposal, the United States delivered a pledge 
"reiterating the sped,fic promise of military assistance. 1119 With these 
desires for increased support, the South American professions of 
solidarity rested upon the foundation of prewar economic assistance and 
14Ibido, P• 71. 
l5Hull, Memoirs, II, 1139· 
16Foreign Relations, 1941, VI, 88-90. 
17Ibido, p .. 111. 
18Ibido, P• 114. 
19Ib·d 41 1 07 po o 
the hopes of gaining additional aid. 
Reacting to Pearl Harbor, the United States Department of State 
endeavored to activate a previous inter-American agreement which called 
for consultation among the American republics if one of them was the 
victim of aggression by an extra-continental power. Since the pre-
ceding inter-American conference had resolved that the next meeting 
site would be Rio de Janeiro, the United States took the first step on 
December 8 in obtaining Brazil's consent to host the conferenceo 20 
On December 10, the American government requested that the Governing 
Board of the Pan American Union invite the American republics to attend 
a consultative conference in January, 1942. Chile, however, had up-
staged its northern neighbor when a similar request from Santiago 
arrived at the Pan American Union the evening before. To avoid possible 
diplomatic problems, Leo S. Rowe, the Director General of the Pan 
American Union, circulated both requests simultaneously to each member 
of the Pan American Board. 21 Once again, the South American republics 
immediately responded favorably to the American cause as eight of the 
ten South American governments agreed within thirty-six hours to the 
proposed conferenceo 2~ Since the agenda which the United States had 
offered with its request contained seven items, of which four related 
to the maintenance and development of the South American economies, 23 
20Ib"d 1 o, Po 74. 
21Ibid., ppo 118-122. 
22Ibido, P• 1250 
23Among the economic matters mentioned in the agenda were considera-
tion of "arrangements for furnishing to each country the imports es-
sential to the maintenance of its domestic economy." Foreign Relations, 
:12l±l, VI, 123. 
financial incentive encouraged the South American countries to agree 
to the conference. 
Before the Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American 
Republics convened in Rio de Janeiro on January 15, 1942, the first 
of two administrative problems concerning the conference developed. 
Venezuela joineO. with some Central American governments in requesting 
that the meeting take place in Washington. Other Latin American re-
publics wanted to transfer the location to Panama, and Chile desired 
to host the conference in Santiago. Cordell Hull tactfully answered 
these requests with the argument that the last inter-American meeting 
had declared that Rio would be the next site. 24 The Secretary of 
State also saw expediency in holding the conference in the Brazilian 
9 
capitalo Besides having been the United States' closest Latin American 
ally during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Brazil, under the 
dictatorship of Getulio Dornellas Vargas, had pledged on December 8 to 
assist the United States in its dealings with the other Latin American 
countries, had denied the Axis use of communication facilities, and 
had begun to silence voices critical of the United States. 25 The United 
States, in the words of its Secretary of State, considered it "highly 
desirable that the meeting be held in Rio de Janeiro, both because of 
the fact that the psychology created by holding th~ meeting in that 
capital would be altogether favorable as well as because of the fact 
24 Ibid., ppo 126-127. 
25s. Walter Washington, !_ Study of the Causes of Hostility toward 
the United States in Latin America: Brazil, U. So Department of State, 
Office of Intelligence Research, External Research Paper No. 126 (Wash-
ington: Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 3-6. Hereafter cited 
as Brazil. 
10 
that • • • the presidency of the conference would be vested in the hands 
of [Oswaldo Aranha], 11 the extremely cooperative Brazilian foreign 
.. t 26 !Illill.S ero 
The second procedural problem relating to the foreign ministers' 
meeti,ng concerned a century-old boundary dispute between Ecuador and 
Peru in the Upper Amazon basin. In 1941, the situation had reached a 
critical point when Peruvian annies marched into the disputed area and 
assumed control. Through the mediation of the United States, Argen-
tina, and Brazil, both sides had accepted a cease-fire but had not 
reconciled their disagreement. As the bombs fell on Pearl Harbor and 
the United States was striving to maintain hemispheric solidarity, the 
Peruvian armed forces occupied an area that two years earlier had 
belonged to Ecuador, When presented with the proposed conference, 
Ecuador agreed in principle to convening such a meeting, but strongly 
indicated that the Ecuadorian representatives would not attend without 
a prior solution to the boundary dispute. The Quito government held 
that it would be incongruous to attend a meeting designed to repel 
aggression outside of the Western Hemisphere while Ecuador was a victim 
of aggression from within the hemisphere. Responding to the Ecuadorian 
requests for discussing the dispute at the conference, Peru declared 
that it would not send a delegation if the subject were on the agenda. 27 
Responding to the impasse, the United States Department of State esca-
lated its mediation attempts in order to find a solution before the 
conference assembled on January 15. As the delegates arrived in the 
26Foreign Relations, 1941, VI, 128e 
27Ibide, P• 123-124. 
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Brazilian capital during the second week of January, mediation still 
had not produced a solution. On January 13, Ecuador's delegation in-
formed the United States that it would not attend the sessions until 
there was an agreement, at least in principle. On this same day, how-
ever, Peru indicated that it was willing to accept something less than 
all the occupied territory. 2S On this basis, Ecuador attended the 
inter-American conference while the three mediatory powers carried on 
private talks with Ecuador and Peru concurrently with the main meeting. 
Every South American republic thus joined the other eleven American 
republics at the conference table in Rio. 
At the final session of the conference, Peru and Ecuador pre-
sented the compromise which they and mediatory powers had reached. 
While Peru received a much larger area and the control of the main 
Amazon tributaries, Ecuador got only a portion of its old El Oro pro-
vince,. which probably contained petroleum, and the right to navigate 
the tributaries. Ecuador's failure to recover its conquered lands was 
at least partially mitigated by generous agreements signed with the 
United States during these private talks. In addition to an American 
pledge to reconstruct Ecuador's portion of the El Oro province, which 
the conflict in 1941 had devastated, Ecuador received sanitation, 
health, stabilization, and development funds amounting to $12 million 
from the United States. 29 Through this method, the United States was 
able to use its economic might to keep both Ecuador and Peru within the 
28Foreign Relations, ~' V, 2h. 
29Ibid., p. 46; ~York ~' January 29-30, 1942; Lewis M. 
Alexander, World PoJ,itical Patterns (Chicago: Rand McNally and 
Campany, 1957) ,. PP• 97~9S.. · .. · · 
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inter-American defensive system. 
The major concern at the Rio meeting was whether or not the Ameri-
can republics would jointly sever relations with the members of the 
Tripartite Pact. Of the ten South American countries, only two had 
broken relations with the Axis powers. Colombia had acted immediately 
following the attack upon Pearl Harbor, and Venezuela followed with a 
similar declaration on December 31, 1941.30 The United States main-
tained that the continuation of Axis diplomatic and consular repre-
sentation created "the gravest danger to the security of all the 
republics and to the ability of the American governments to take the 
necessary and adequate measures of defense. 1131 These diplomats were in 
a position to report on shipping movements, interfere with defense 
preparations, spread propaganda, foment internal disorder, and, hence, 
engage "in every type of subversive activity. 1132 Severing of diplo-
matic relations with the Axis by all the American republics would not 
only rid the hemisphere of these dangerous agents, but also project the 
image of a united Western Hemisphere for propaganda purposes. On 
January 1, therefore, the United States dispatched a draft resolution 
to two of the more cooperative countries, Brazil and Uruguay. If the 
Foreign Ministers Conference would adopt this proposal, all American 
republics would jointly rupture all financial, commercial, and political 
relations with the Tripartite powers. 33 After receiving favorable 
30u.s .. , Department of State, Department 2.f. State Bulletin, Vol. VI, 
no., 147 (April 18, 1942), 349. 
3lForeign Relations, ~' V, 10. 
32Ibid~ 
33Ibid., for Uruguay seep. 11, and for Brazil see P• 15. 
13 
replies, a meeting on January 7 between Cordell Hull and the conference 
delegation led by Sumner Welles decided upon the primary goal of the 
United States at the conference. Namely, the North American republic 
would press for the meeting's approval of the draft resolution by 
which all the states of the Western Hemisphere would jointly sever 
relations. 34 This proposed resolution served as the backdrop to the 
diplomatic conflict at Rio de Janeiro. 
Argentina's Acting President Ramo'ri S. Castillo, who became the 
'fly in the ointment,' objected to the resolution requiring his govern-
ment to terminate relations. Maintaining that the resolution infringed 
upon Argentina's sovereign right to conduct its foreign policy however 
it deemed necessary, the Argentina foreign minister, Enrique Ruiz 
Gui~z-!, said that severance of relations was a pre-belligerent step 
which would violate Argentina's neutra1ity. 35 Prudently, Argentina 
had chosen the neutral course because the "lack of military and naval 
defense which makes it impossible to take ••• 'any pre-belligerent 
action' that might subject them to attack by the Axis Powers. 1136 One-
fifth of the Argentine population was of German or Italian origin, and 
that 11to a politician, is important" with an election scheduled for 
April 1.37 In conjunction with this neutrality, the Buenos Aires 
government had declared immediately after Pearl Harbor that it would 
not consider the United States as a belligerent under Argentine 
34Hull, Memoirs, II, 1041. 
35Enrique Ruiz Guillazf, La Politica Argentina y:_ tl Futuro de America 
(Buenos Aires: Liberia Huenul, 1944), pp. 68-70. 
36Foreign Relations, 1942, V, 27. 
37Ibid., P• 17. 
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neutrality laws. The Argentine government, therefore, was attempting 
to pursue a pro-United States neutrality which was similar to the policy 
the United States had followed toward Great Britain before Pearl Harbore 
This pro-Allied neutrality apparently pleased the majority of the 
Argentine citizenry who favored the Allied cause and who also wanted 
to avoid ware A North American student, Francis Herron, wrote that 
most people in Argentina, especially in the Buenos Aires region, desired 
an Allied victory, "yet they oppose the Argentine government taking 
an unneutral stand. 113S A noted Argentine scholar, Enrique Gil, con-
curred with Herron's analysis. 39 When Norman Armour, the American 
ambassador, questioned Rear Admiral Gonzalo D. Bustamente about the 
severance of diplomatic relations, the pro-Allied Argentine replied, 
"We must weigh the advantages against the disadvantages. .. • • I still 
feel that the advantages to be gained by such a step would not compen-
sate for the disadvantages.1140 With the support of its people, Argen-
tina approached the :Rio conference with a two-fold and, possibly, 
contradictory purpose, that is to maintain hemispheric solidarity as 
an aid to the United States and to preserve Argentine neutrality in the 
interests of a sovereign nation's expediency. 
To reach this goal, Enrique Ruiz GuinazU"' attempted to secure the 
support of the uncommitted countries before the conference convenede 
In addition to presenting the Argentine position through regular 
3SFrancis Herron, Letters ~the Argentine (New York: G. Po 
Putnam's Sons, 1943), pp .. 39-40, 2SO. 
39New York Times, July 5, 1942; Samuel Guy Inman, "Argentina," in 
What the south' Americans Think of Us, Pe 2S3. 
_....,._. ' .-
40Foreign Relations, 1942, V, lS. 
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diplomatic channels, the chief diplomat for Argentina arranged for the 
delegations from Peru, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay to meet in Buenos 
Aires for 'hospitality and conversation' while enroute to Rio. From 
Buenos Aires, the Argentine delegation would accompany the other 
representatives to the Brazilian capital aboard a slow-moving luxury 
liner. 41 These meetings would provide ample opportunity for Ruiz 
GuinazU" to persuade the undec,;i.ided countrie~ of the correctness of 
Argentina's pro-United States neutraj,J.ty. 
Uruguay was the first country to reject the Argentine position 
when Foreign Minister Albert Guani pledged on January 2 his support 
of the resolution calling for a joint breaking of relations with the 
Axis countries.42 Realizing that Guani had devoted his public career 
to strengthening inter-American solidarity, Cordell Hull had presented 
the resolution on the joint severance of relations to the Montevideo 
government as the determining factor of "whether the practical solid-
arity for which Uruguay and the United States have worked so hard dur-
ing these past 9 years is to be a reality or not. 1143 The signing of 
a Lend-Lease agreement between Uruguay and the United States on 
January 13 added $17 million in military assistance to this desire for 
h . h . l'd 't 44 emisp eric so i an y. 
The diplomats from Paraguay and Peru deserted Argentina after they 
arrived in Rio and had private talks with Under Secretary of State 
~ew !£.!:!£Times, January 3, 1942. 
42Foreign Relations, 1942, V, 11. 
43Ibid., P• 10. 
44Ibido, VI, 703. 
Sumner Welles, leader of the American delegation. With the flattery 
of the United, States :raising its Asunci6'n mission to the rank of an 
embassy, Paraguay elected to support "the policy of mutual assistance 
and reciprocal cooperation" and the country with whom it had signed 
a Lend-Lease agreement on September 20, 1941.45 Just after Pearl 
Harbor, Peru had informed the United States that it was "disposed to 
sever relations ,.,;·~ .,.,, • »i:1 if the United States would be willing to 
16 
lend financial assistance in connection with the necessary internment 
of Japanese citizens in Peru. 1146 After consulting with Welles in Rio, 
Peru elected to support the United States position "most actively in 
order to share in the victory.1147 A few days later, while the con-
ference was still in progress, President Roosevelt told General George 
C• Marshall, the American Chief of Staff, to "wire Welles at once 
telling him that he can offer some • • • [coastal defense] guns to 
• • • Peru • • ., if he cares to do so • Give him also the ammunition 
·'. ·:-. "'· 
45Foreign Relation§!, ~' VII, 480. Regarding the elevation of 
the United State~ mission to the r~ of embassy, Ecuador and Bolivia 
were also honored in this fashion on the same date• This act brought 
all North American missions in Latin America to the level of an em-
bassy. New York Times, January 6, 1942. ~ .................................... 
46Foreign Relations, 1941, VI, 125. 
47 Carlos Sayan Alvarez, Polfrica Nacional e Internacional del Pert, 
Vol. VI of Discursos z Conferencias~ ed. by Roberto Rojas V. (Lima: 
Relieves Americanos, 1943), p. 40. LAuthor's translation.] 
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on hand for them. n48 Both Paraguay and Peru wanted aid in return for 
their cooperation, and the United States was willing to provide it. 
Of all the South American countries, Bolivia used the Rio Con-
ference to its fullest benefit. In its communications with the United 
"'" States and Argentina before the conference, the Penaranda government 
was offering its support to both parties. The North American republic 
grew to realize, however, that "Bolivian cooperation has been so far 
purely lip service. 1149 When the Bolivian delegation journeyed to Rio 
via Buenos Aires, it carried instructions to cooperate with the United 
States in return for the United States increasing assistance to at least 
$40 million and raising the price of Bolivian minerals, namely tin and 
tungsten.50 From the negotiations with Welles in Rio, Bolivia received 
$40.5 million in grants and loans. While obtaining only a commitment 
from the United States to continue price negotiations for the strategic 
materials, the Bolivian delegation secured a pledge that the United 
States would grant credit for the stabilization of Bolivian currency 
and would use its good offices to settle Bolivia's problem with 
Standard Oi1.5l Consequently, the United States secured the support 
. 
48In the President's quoted memorandum, he included Uruguay, Chile, 
Ecuador, and Venezuela along with Peru. According to the memorandum, 
the final decision as to the dispersal of the guns was laid in the 
hands of Su,mner Welles. This implies that the dispersal of these guns 
was a diplomatic decision rather than a military one. Of the possible 
recipients, only Chile would decide against the United States at Rio, 
but Chile had not finally made that decision when Roosevelt dispatched 
the quoted memorandum. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, llfil; His Personal 
Letters, 1928-1945, ed. by Elliot Roosevelt (2 vols.; New York; Duell, 
Sloan, and Pearce, 1947), II, 1278. 
49Foreign R.elations, 1942, V, 15. 
50Ib'd 
J. .. ' 515, 522. 
51Ibid., PP• 587-589, 593-597. 
of Bolivia by providing economic rewards. 
The Chilean government, whose allegiance was undetermined, was 
concerned over its long, unprotected coastline and the possibility of 
a Japanese attack in retaliation for the rupture of relations. Con-
fronting the situation with what Hull described as "indecision and 
timidity and some fear, 11 52 Chile informed the United States that 
Tripartite diplomats would remain in Santiago unless the northern 
18 
neighbor immediately promised thirty-six combat planes and sixty-three 
anti-aircraft guns. 53 This promise would comprise part of an over-all 
defense agreement by which "Chile could count upon effective military 
assistance from the United States and that technical details of such 
assistance would' be a.greed upon in the immediate future. 1154 Since 
the United States had suffered a tremendous naval loss at Pearl Harbor 
and would be unable to begin massive production of war material in the 
near future, the Roosevelt administration felt that it was not in a 
position to extend "effective military assistance • • • in the 
immediate future." Responding to this Chilean request, the North 
American government countered with a proposal that "in the event of an 
attack by a non-American country against Chile, [the United States] 
will take immediate steps to send naval, air and land forces to repulse 
this aggression. n55 This proposal for .aid after an attack rather than 
before an attack was unacceptable to Chile which thereupon decided to 
52Ibido, P• 22. 
5\echam, United States ~ Inter-American Security, p. 211. 
54Foreign Relations, ~' V, 59. 
55Ibid., P• 42. 
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follow the Argentine lead against the joint declaration to cut diplo-
matic relations. 56 The loss of Chilean support for the United States 
proposal resulted from the United States' inability to pay Chile's 
price and Chile's refusal to accept the United States' counteroffer. 
Soon after Sumner Welles and the United States delegation arrived 
in Rio de Janeiro, the major problem that emerged was how to persuade 
Argentina to join with the other American states in accepting the 
resolution on the joint break of relations which Mex:ico, Venezuela, 
and Colombia had proposed on the meeting's first day. The United 
States hoped not only to rid the Western Hemisphere of Axis agents but 
also to maintain hemispheric unity through a unanimous vote on the 
declaration. In the course of a private conversation between Welles 
and Ruiz Guinaz~ on the opening day of the conference, the Argentine 
foreign minister indicated that the solid front of American states was 
leading him to favor the specified action, In order to approve such 
an action, however, Ruiz Guil'raz( indicated that he needed new instruc-
tions. 57 On the following day, word came from Acting President Castillo 
that the earlier instructions would stand.58 
During the next few days, We11es and the Argentine foreign 
minister attempted to negotiate a satisfactory solution to the problem. 
During these conversations, Welles said he "studiously avoided ••• 
any syllable which could be used by him as a complaint that the United 
56Ib. d 
l. .• ' PP• 28, 44. 
57Ibid., P• 28. 
58Ibid., P• ,1JO. ,, 
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States was bringing economic or financial pressure upon .A,rgentina. 11 59 
The head of the United States delegation, however, instructed his 
assistants to inform their Argentine counterparts "that at a· time like 
this the economic and financial assistance which the United States can 
give the other American Republics will necessarily be given only to 
those nations which are whole-heartedly and effectively cooperating 
with us. 1160 With this pressure and the solid support of other Latin 
American countries, the Argentine foreign minister proposed on the 
night of January 19 that the declaration include a clause "which would 
state that any American republics which felt it impossible to take the 
action contemplated ••• immediately would be able later to adhere 
thereto." With this cla'\lse, Ruiz GuinazU" explaj.ned, Argentina could 
act after the April elections. 61 Rejecting the additional phrase be-
cause it would not fulfill the United States goal of immediate joint 
action, Su.mn,er Welles replied that it was his "firm belief that it 
constituted a retrogression and was highly unsatisfacto:ry. 1162 The 
deadlock between the United States and Argentina again appeared broken 
on the evening of January 21 when Ruiz Gui~azl and Welles agreed upon 
a new wording through the mediation of Brazil's Aranha. Declaring that 
the American republics could no longer maintain relations with Germany, 
Italy, and Japan, the new resolution included the modification that 
the American states were acting "on the exercise of their sovereignity 
and in conformity with their constitutions and powers, provided that 
59Ibid., P• 32. 
60Ibid. 
61Ibido, P• 31. 
62:rbid. 
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the latter are in agreement. 1163 When Argentina's president rejected 
the proposed compromise on the following morning, the impasse quickly 
64 
redeveloped. 
From a heated debate on January 23, the conference committee dis-
cussing the difficult problem developed a new compromise resolution to 
which Sumner Welles agreed. Rather than a joint declaration on break-
ing relations, the "American Republics, consequently following the 
procedure established by their own laws within the position and cir-
cumstances of each country in the actual continental conflict, recom-
mend the rupture of their diplomatic relations with Japan, Germany, 
and Italy. 1165 The compromise had an escape clause which made the 
resolution applicable to each country individually. Mo:re importantly, 
the resolution only recommended the severance of relations and thus 
contradicted the United States main goal of a joint declaration at 
the conference. 
In Washington, Secretary of State Hull received word of the 
compromise via a radio news broadcast and immediately telephoned Welles 
in Rio. During the private telephone conversation, Hull ordered his 
assistant to announce that the United States would oppose the new 
resolution and accept a nineteen-to-two vote on the original resolu-
tion. Sumner Welles requested that the President decide the issue. 
Through a three-way telephone connection, Roosevelt listened to Hull's 
explanation of the necessity for a joint declaration to cut diplomatic 
63Ibid., P• 33, 
64Ibid., PP• 33-34 
b5Ibid., P• 35. 
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relations and to Welles' argument on the need to preserve hemispheric 
unity through a unanimoue vote on the controversial proposal. After 
listening to both arguments, the chief executive decided that the 
United States should support Welles' decision and the compromise reso-
lution. Not unexpectedly, Hull and Welles gave differing accounts 
of Roosevelt's reasoning. Hull maintains that Roosevelt elected to 
support Welles' decision because the United States had already stated 
that it would accept the compromise and the conference was in the 
process of adjourning. Regardless of which pol,icy the North American 
government should follow, reconsideration of the compromise would not 
be feasible under such circumstances. 66 Welle$, on··the other hand, wrote 
that the President decided that his course was the correct one and 
said, "In this case I am going to take the judgment of the man on the 
spot. 1167 With Washington's failure to override Welles' compromise, the 
Rio conference had unanimity on a resolution which only recommended that 
the American nations break relations with the Axis. 
While the conference was hammering out the paramount resolution I 
on the rupture of relations, various other committees were drafting 
forty other resolutions covering such diverse subjects as solidarity, 
hemispheric defense, economic cooperation, communications, humanitarian 
and health measures, postwar organization, and international law. The 
Foreign ~inisters Conference unanimously approved all forty-one reso-
lutions with only scattered reservations. Chile gave its approval to 
all the resolutions only on the condition that they did not conflict 
66Hu:t.1, Memoirs, II, ll48-ll49• 
67sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York: 
Harper Brothers, Publishers, 1950), PP• 115-U7. 
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with Chile's constitution and that the Chilean congress ratifies them. 
Only Chile's reservation was of general application; the other modifi-
cations applied to particular resolutions. Guatemala approved of the 
endorsement of the Atlantic Charter only in so far as its claims to 
portions of British Honduras were not effected. Referring to another 
boundary dispute, Peru limited its endorsement of two resolutions so 
that they would not apply to its conflict with Ecuador. Argentina 
added a reservation to the conference recommendation that the American 
republics sever all commercial and financial relations with the Tripar-
tite powers. Wanting to refrain from any unneutral act, the Castillo 
government applied it to all belligerents outside of the Western 
Hemisphere. Even the United States modified its approval of a resolu-
tion. When the conference called for the development of commercial 
interchange, the United St~tes agreed onl,y if such advancement was 
consistent with reciprocal trade treaties which W~shington had signed 
with countries outside of the hemisphere. 6B Since these reservations 
were minor, the United States had achieved basic unani~ity among the 
American republics. 
A North American radio commentator offered an insight into the 
foundation of this unity. As this correspondent summed up the final 
act of the Third Foreign Ministers Conference, "In return for a unani-
mous agreement of twenty nations to break commercial ties with the 
Axis, and almost unanimous agreement to break diplomatic relations, a 
joint agreement to try to root out Axis agents everywhere, we [the 
United States] have pledged ourselves not only to help maintain the 
6Bworld Peace Foundation, Documents 2E,American Foreign Relations, 
ed. by Leland M. Goodrich (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1942), IV, 
293-329. 
24 
faltering economic systems by which 120,000,000 persons live, and to 
increase their productivity, but more important and more difficult, 
physically to protect them from attack by the Axis. 1169 The reciprocity, 
therefore, was the promise of economic and military aid from the United 
States in exchange for the pledge of cooperation from the Latin Ameri-
can governments. 
As the Rio conference closed, a rapid succession of South American 
republics followed the meeting's recommendations and severed relations 
with the Axis powers. During the last week of January, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay returned the passports of th,e diplomats 
and consuls from Germany, Italy, and Japan and ordered them to leave. ?O 
This left Argentina and Chile as the only countries in the Western 
Hemisphere· to contin~ relations with the totalitarian powers. The 
success which the United States had in securing the political coopera-
tion of the eight South American governments resulted in a large 
measure from the role of economic benefits which the United States 
proffered. It was not 'all for one and one for all' in the spirit of 
a 'good neighbor.' The next step would be to obtain Argentina's and 
Chile's compliance with the Rio recommendations and thus to make politi-
cal cooperation unanimous. Believing that the Axis representatives in 
these two countries were centers of subversion, espionage, and propa-
ganda, the United States instituted economic sanctions and inter-
69Eric Se.vareid, "Where Do We Go From Rio?" Saturday Evening 
~' March 28, 1942, p. 27. 
70u.. s., Department of State, Departmxnt of State Bu].letin, Vol. 
VI, no. 147 (April 18, 1942), for Bolivia and Brazil see P• 339, for 
Ecuador see p. 340, and for Paraguay and Peru see p. 348. 
Aroorican pressures to persuade these southern nei$hbors· to sever re-
lations or at least take steps which would eliminate the influence 
of Axi,s agents. 
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CHAPTER II 
POLITICAL COOPERATION: THE AFTERMATH OF R;J:O 
As Sumner Welles retuzned from the Foreign Ministers Conference 
at Rio, nineteen of the twenty-one American republics had terminated 
diplomatic and copunercial relations with Germany, Italy, and Japan. 
Concezning the two holdouts, Argentina and Chile, the United States 
had to develop a separate policy. The Roosevelt administration 
sincerely believed that the Axis missions and consulates in Argentina 
and Chile coordinated espionage activity in the Americas, Subversive 
agents throughout the Western Hemisphere could relay through their 
diplomats in Santiago and Buenos Aires information vital to the security 
of the United States. In addition to general military, economic, and 
political information, the Axis diplomats could radio data on American 
shipping arrivals, departures, routes, and destinations which was in-
valuable to the success of German submarine attacks.1 Consequently, 
the United States government believed that persuading the governments 
at Buenos Aires and Santiago to sever relations was synonomous with 
removing the centers of Axis e~pionage from the Western Hemisphere. 
In its attempt to achi~ve this goal, the Roosevelt administration 
first tried to apply economic coercion. After this method had failed, 
the United States perverted the inter-American system to pressure 
1Fareign Relations, 1242, V, 226. 
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Argentina and Chile to al.ter their foreign policy. ln the meantime, the 
United States tried to lessen the effects of German subversive agents 
by using the power of North American corporations to cut commercial 
communication circuits from Argentina and Chile to the A.xis nations. 
Despite these efforts, Argentina and Chile had not severed either 
diplomatic relations or teleconununications when the Allied armies in-
vaded North Africa in November, 1942. 
The United States policy toward Argentina, as Welles had made 
clear to Ruiz GuiBazti during the:i,r conversations in Rio, 2 was formally 
communicated to the Castillo regime on February 5, 1942. The Roosevelt 
administration informed the Argentine Foreign Ministry "that inasmuch 
as the Argentine Government has determined to maintain • • • neutrality 
and ••• the other American republics have either declared war or 
broken relations with the .A.xis powers •• , , th~ military and naval 
materiel which can be spared by the United States can logically only be 
allotted to the latter American nations. 113 This 'no-arms' policy 
conflicted with an invitation which the United States had extended in 
the summer of 1941 for an Argentine naval and military mission to come 
to Washington for staff conversations. The function of these confer-
ences was to prepare for the signing of a Lend-Lease agreement, When 
the army and navy representatives of Argentina arrived a few days after 
Pearl Harbor, the Roosevelt administration had committed itself to 
begin discussions with Argentina concerning United States military aid.4 
During December, the prime question concerned the Argentine desire that 
2Ibid., P• 376 • 
.3Ibid,, P• .377. 
4Hull, Memoirs, II, l.37B. 
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the United States permit its accredited diplomats in Washington to 
join these staff conversations. The United States refused this proposal 
because it maintained that the matters under discussion were of a purely 
non-political, technical nature--how the two military establishments 
could cooperate in the defen~e of the hemisphere. Once the military 
and naval chiefs had agreed upon a totally non-political joint defense 
arrangement, the diplomats would negotiate the political implications 
and give their final approval. 5 Under this arrangement, the military 
staffs drafted during January a comprehensive defense plan by which 
the United States would provide military aid for Argentine use. While 
the agreement specified that deli very of the army- and navy supplies 
was to begin in 1942, it also stipulated that the joint arrangement 
would be effective only if Argentina entered the war. The question of 
what would happen if Argentina did not declare war in 1942 was of a 
political nature and Left unanswered by the military commanders. When 
the Roosevelt aQniinistration decided in early February upon its 'no 
arms for Argentina' policy, the military of each country had verbally 
agreed to a plan of joint defense which entailed military aid. The 
only procedure left for the military negotiators was the formal signing. 
In trying to decide whether or not to conclude the military docu-
ment, the United States had to reconcile the differing desires of its 
diplomats and its military. For strategic purposes, the North American 
military was anxious to sign the agreement by which Argentina would 
protect the passage around the southern tip of the American continento 
The security of this route would be invaluable if a German hit-and-run 
5Foreign Relations, ~' V, 371-372. 
attack closed the Panama Canal. The United States naval authorities, 
furthermore, had enjoyed the cordial friendship of the Argentine navy 
and did not wish to lose such goodwi11. 6 For these reasons, the 
Departments of War and Navy had instructed their representatives to 
the staff conferences to sign the document. After the signing, the 
military proposed that the President or the State Department inform 
the Argentine government that the United States would not provide the 
military assistance. The North American officials could base their 
refusal upon the invalid premise that Argentina would enter the war 
since the Latin American country had given no indication that it would 
budge from its neutral position. In this way, the United States mili-
tary argue~, the Argentine naval and army authorj,.ties "would not feel 
rebuffed • • • and • • • they might • • • use this influence in favor 
of a change in Argentine policy.117 Following this line of reasoning 
and their written instructions, the United States members of the staff 
negotiations were preparing to sign the technical document. 
Since the State Department objected to any signed agreement, 
Sumner Welles intervened and secured new orders for the military 
negotiatiors to delay temporarily the formal conclusion, 6 The diplo-
mats felt that any completed agreement could appear as United States 
approval of Argentine neutrality since it seemingly "had not affected 
our policy so far as the furnishing of war material is concerned. 119 
6Ibid.' PP• 377-361. 
7Thid., P• 3Bl. 
B 379. Ibid., P• 
9rbid., P• 3a4. 
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Because the arrangement was a preliminary step to the signing of a 
Lend-Lease pact, it also "might be interpreted ••• as a 00mm.itR!$ndi: 
to enter into a lease-lend agreement • • • even though no change in the 
present policy of the Argentine Government had occurred in the 1I1ean~ ·. 
time. 1110 An impasse thus developed between the military and diplo-
matic branches of the Roosevelt administration. 
To circumvent this conflict, the State Department persuaded the 
United States military negotiators to propose amendments to the techni-
cal agreement. If the Argentine navy would agree to aid immediately the 
convoying of roorchant ships, the United States would reciprocate by 
sending the naval supplies outlined in the arrangement and by entering 
without delay into negotiations for a Lend-Lease agreement.11 Although 
the proposal obviously injected a political issue into the talks which 
the Roosevelt administration had claimed in December to be non-political, 
the offer of military assistance would keep the pro-United States 
Argentine navy content and would "secure from Argentina some positive 
contribution to the maintenance of the security of the Hemisphere."12 
After the Argentine military commission correctly replied that this 
addition was "a political matter, therefore •• o outside of the orbit 
and attitudes of this Delegation for consideration, 1113 the Argentine 
ambassador informed the State Department that his government could not 
accept it because convoying United States ships "would involve his 
lOibid. 
11Ibid, ' p' 385. 
12Ibid. 
13Ib.d 1 ., P• 386. 
country in the war. 1114 With this rejection, the United States 
announced in the final meeting of the military qommissioners on March 
20 that it would refuse to sign the agreement.15 The United States 
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offers of military assistance, therefore, failed to gain active Argen-
tine cooperation. The only result was that the Argentine naval 
officers who went to Wash~ngton were bitter over the State Department's 
imposition of new conditions after an agreement had been reached.16 
The issue of military assistance to Buenos Aires was not yet dead, 
at least as far as Argentina was concerned. During April and May, the 
Castillo government was presenting to Washington additional arguments 
on why it should receive aid. While admitting it had no intention of 
severing diplomatic relations, the Argentine government maintained that 
it was contributing to hemisphere defense and that it was maintaining 
a pro-Allied neutrality. The South American government also claimed 
that the United States had indicated in its notes in the summer of 1941 
that the completion of a technical military agreement, while helpful, 
was not a~ gua wm, to a Lend ... Lease agreement,17 The State Depart-
ment drafted a reply which explained that the attack upon Pearl Harbor 
had precipitated a "very different situation" from the first exchange 
of notes about military assistance. As a result of this new situation, 
the United States could only provide military assistance to American 
countries "which have placed themselves in the forefront of hemispheric 
14-rhid. 
15Ibid. , P• .387 • 
16Ibid., p., .396. 
l?Ibid., PP• .387-.394. 
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defense" by either declaring war or by breaking relations. The least 
that Argentina could do was to aid in keeping the sea lanes opened by 
convoying ships. This wo'l,l.ld help convince the other American republics 
that Argentina "was making its contribution to the maintenance of hemie-
pheric solidarity and therefore was entitled to share in the distribution 
of the a:rmament.1118 Although President Castillo had promised to give 
and was giving serious consideration to the convoy proposal at the end 
of May,19 the Secretary of State sent a terse telegram to the United 
States ambassador in Buen9s Aires. Referring to a previous message 
of final United States rejection of aid, Hull wired, "Please present the 
Department's note. 1120 The United States thus refused to modify its 
sanction of 'no arms for Argentina' until Argentina had altered its 
policy. Ruiz GuDfii.z~ the Argentine foreign minister, summed up the 
denial of Lend-Lease aid to Argentina, "By denying strategic materials, 
a detestable system of coercion, bitterly similar to totalitarian 
21 
methods, was created." 
Although the United States flatly rejected any possibility of 
providing Argentin~ with military assistance until Buenos Aires had 
broken relations with the Axis, the United States continued to supply 
armaments to Chile, the only other A~rican republic which had not 
severed relations. On the same day that the United States formally 
enunciated its Argentina policy, the United States proffered to Chile 
lSib'd 
l. • ' P• 397. 
19Ibid., P• 399. 
20Ibid., P• 400. 
21auiz GuinazU:, 1!, Polftica Argentina, p. Z'/. [Author's transla-
tion]. · · 
four 155-millimeter batteries to defend the coastline and 300 men to 
train the Chilean anny in the use of the artillery, 22 The difference 
in policy regarding Chile rested upon the extreme importance which 
Chile's copper mines played in the United States war effort. 23 For 
example, a hit-and-run attack could destroy a strategic, totally 
unprotected power plant and thus halt production of copper for 
months. 24 These coastal batteries would not only protect the United 
States copper supply, but also provide good public relations if they 
arrived coincidental with the opening of the Chilean congress in the 
first week of March. Since the legislative body was to consider the 
Rio resolutions, these four coastal batteries could help reduce the 
opposition to ratification. 25 Rossetti, the adept Chilean foreign 
minister, told the United States ambassador th.at 11he could not and 
would not ask for ratification of the resolution rupture [sic] of re-
lations without this material, 1126 The desire to protect the United 
States supply of copper and to prompt severance of relations en-
couraged the divergence of United States policy toward Chile from its 
position toward Argentina. 
The United States was also sympathetic to the domestic situation 
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duced to 108 men at the insistance of Rossetti. As he stated to the 
American ambassador, "It was impossible in view o.t' Chilean psychology 
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military advisors to enter Chilean soil." Ibid., p. 13, 
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in Chile. Besides appreciating the Chileans' fear of an attack upon 
its unguarded coastline, 27 the United States saw that domestic politi-
cal problems complicated Chile's foreign policy. President Pedro 
Aguirre Cerd' had died a few weeks prior to Pearl Harbor, and the 
Santiago government had scheduled elections for February 1, 1942, to 
fill the vacancy. The United States, consequ.ently, refrained from a 
hard and fast policy during January lest an adverse Chilean reaction 
occur during the political campaign, Although Juan Antonio Ribs had not 
promised to tenninate relations with the Axis in the presidential con-
test, he won the election as a strong democrat sympathetic to the 
Allied cause. 28 The lame duck foreign minister, Rossetti, was reluc-
tant to embark upon any strong deviation from Chile's traditionally 
neutral policy. Yet, when the foreign minister was negotiating for 
anns, he would o~en indicate that Chile would sever relations in the 
near future. 29 Rossetti's promises, however, never materialized. 
These assurances that severance of relations was imminent is yet 
another reason for the difference in United States policy toward Chile 
from that toward Argentina, 
Japanese pressure upon Chile was the main cause for Rossetti's 
failure to keep his pledge that Chile would break relations during his 
tenureo In a conversation with Rossetti on Feb:r;uary 14, the Japanese 
minister offered high prices for Chilean products and predicted the 
Axis occupation of Austra1ia during the spring, More importantly, 
27Hull, Memoirs, II, 1383. 
28Austin F. MacDonald, Latin Aroorican Politics and Goverrurent 
(2nd ed.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954),' pp. 315-318. 
29Foreign Relations, ~, V, 31, 43; VI, 12. 
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Tokyo's envoy threatened to retaliate wJ.th submarine attacks upon Chile 
and its shipping if relations were cut. As the United Statefi arribassa-
dor reported, "The Foreign Minister was deeply impressed with the con-
versation of the Japanese Minister. ,,3o After Rfos assumed office on 
April 2, 1942, Japan empl,oyed similar tactics with the new government. 
Under the threat of the destruction of Chile's merchant i'leet, the new 
chief of state promised that his country would maintain its neutrali-
ty. 31 The Japanese threats, therefore, not only kept Rossetti from 
implementing his assurances to tenninate rel.ations, but also secured 
a pledge from the new regime not to do so. 
When faced with this new intransigence, the United States esca-
lated its policy of economic coercion against Chile. When the Santiago 
government inquired in the first week of June about possible economic 
as well as military assistance, 32 Cordell Hull infoX'llled his emissary in 
Santiago that the United States "cannot discuss this assistance "Until 
after we know what Chile's policy is to be."3.3 A resolution of the 
difficulty with Chile appeared possible after the Chilean ambassador 
had returned from a brief visit to Santiago and met wJ.th State Depart-
ment officials and with President Roosevelt. In these talks, the 
ambassador once again summarized his country's position. Although a 
great majority of' the Chilean people favored the cause of the United 
3oibid. , VI, 14. 
3libid., p. 20. The new government in Santiago also refused to 
submit the Rio resolutions to the Chilean congress on the basis that 
the executive branch had exclusive jurisdiction over foreign affairs. 
Ibid., PP• 20-21. 
32Ibid., PP• 22-23. 
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States, Chileans feared an attack if it took any unneutral action, such 
as cutting diplomatic and commercial relations with the Tr~partite 
powers. As the Chilean envoy explained to the president on August 5, 
"unless Chile could obtain military and naval matt'ri~l which would make 
it possible for Chile to undertake at least a minimum of self-defense, 
o • • public opinion • • • would not support his Government in a 
breaking of relations with the Axis countries. 1134 Reacting to this 
domestic situation, President Roosevelt pledged fifty to one hundred 
patrol planes if Chile broke diplomatic relations • .35 With these planes 
providing 'at least a minimum of self-defense' for Chile, the President 
was quite confident that these additional armaments would lead Chile 
to break relations in the near future. To leave no doubt regarding 
Chile's future policy, Roosevelt gave an additional pledge to afos 
that the United States would militarily intervene to prevent the over-
throw of Chile's government. Guaranteeing full United States support 
if rupturing relations precipitated an Axis attack "or if real trouble 
should be created in Chile by Axis ••• agents,1136 the Roosevelt offer 
was highly reminiscent of the Coloso ~Norte of the early 1900's. 
To implement the verbal agreement between the President and the am-
bassador, the United States formally proposed on August 14 that 147 
planes form the basis of a Lend-Lease pact which the two countries 
would sign after Chile broke relations. While both sides claimed that 
they were not bargaining, the Chilean government replied that it would 
34Ibid., P• 29. 
35rbida, PP• 30-31. 
36Ibidq P• 31. 
break relations only after it had signed the Lend-Lease agreement and 
had begun to receive the military material from the United States. 
Remembering the many unkept promises of the i'orroor foreign minister, 
the United States refused to make any pledges of aid until Chile had 
broken relations. A stalemate, therefore, developed over whether aid 
or termination of relations would come first, and the United States 
failed to obtain a change in the policy of the 'shoestring' republic. 
Another 'chicken and the egg' argument with Chile resulted from 
37 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's conversation with the Chilean ambassador on 
August 5. The President had invited Antonio Rf6s to Washington in the 
belief that Santiago would immediately send the German, Italian, and 
Japanese diplomats home. When Chile balked at rupturing relations, the 
proposed state v:i,sit changed from a nice gesture rewarding a new ally 
to an awkward vehicle entertaining a neutral. Understandably, the 
United States wanted the President of Chile to come to Washington only 
after the severance of relations. The South American country, on the 
other hand, wanted to sever relations after the visit in hopes that the 
face-to-face negotiations could produce large amounts of economic 
assistance in return for a change in policy. Claiming to refuse to 
bargain, the United States gove:rnment believed that if Rfos severed 
relations immediately following a visit to Washington, critics would 
suspect that it had applied undue pressure.37 The question of whether 
the severance of relations would preceed or follow the visit of Rfos 
was still unanswered as the time drew nearer for the president's de-
parture from Santiago. 
37Ibid~, PP• 32-36. 
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Intent upon visiting the United States, the South American execu-
tive was Ell.so planning to visit the Latin American countries along the 
Pacific coast. Between his farewell dinner given by the Chilean 
congress and his departure, word arrived of Sumrier Welles' speech in 
Boston on October 8, 1942.38 Before the National Council on Foreign 
Trade, the Under Secretary of State declared that Argentina and Chile 
are still permitting their territory to be utilized by the 
officials anQ. the subversive agents of the Axis as a base 
for hostile activities against their neighbors •••• I 
cannot believe that these two republics will continue long 
to permit their brothers and neighbors of the Americas, 
engaged as they are in a life and death struggle to preserve 
the liberties and integrity of the New World, to be stabbed 
in the back by Axis emissaries operating in the territory 
and under the free institutions of these two republics of 
the Weste!Tl Hemisphere.39 
To this call for an inter-American condemnation of Chile and Argentina, 
the reaction in Santiago was "instantaneous, emphatic, furious, and 
unanimous, n40 Rt6s, personally humiliated and insulted, immediately 
cancelled his proposed trip and solved the United States dilemma of 
entertaining him before he had severed relations. On October 10, 1942, 
Chile and Argentina sent strongly worded, separate protests in which 
the latter expressed its "strong displeasure of the statements ••• 
being in open contradiction to reality~141 Each country's populace 
indignantly reacted to Welles' announcement. As a North American stu-
dent in Argentina wrote, "Certainly, we shall not improve our standing 
38c1aude G. Bowers, Chile Through Embassy Windows: 1929-1953 (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), p. 11,0, 
39u.s., Department of State, Department 2f State Bulletin, Vol, VII, 
no. 172 (October 10, 1942), p. 810. 
40Bowers, Chile Through Embassy Windows, p. 110. 
41Foreign Relations, ~, V, 210. 
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in Argentine circles by calling Castillo, his ministers, and the leaders 
of the Argentine army fascists. That is a tactless approach. Even pro-
democratic Argentines resent our speaking of their national leaders in 
that way.n42 Deviating from the avowed Good Neighbor Policy, the 
Welles' speech was a public criticism of the policy of a Latin Ameri-
can government by a high official of the United States. This was the 
first time that this had happened since Cordell Hull's criticism of 
Mexico during the early years of the oil expropriation controversy. 43 
Preceding Sumner Welles' speech in Boston, the United States had 
quietly attempted to limit the harm which subversion could do in the 
Western Hemisphere by taking unpublicized actions to contain espionage 
activity in Argentina. After waiting five months for Argentina to 
implement the Rio recommendations to termiil.ate relations or to take 
effective action against German spies, the United States launched on 
July 6 a quiet diplomatic effort to persuade Argentina to eliminate 
espionage. In several informal, mildly worded memoranda, the United 
States complained that Argentina had made no effort"to limit the travel 
of Axis personnel, reduce communication with the Tripartite powers, 
or lessen pro-German propaganda in Argentina. In reply, Buenos Aires 
maintained that it had indeed curtailed all non-diplomatic movement by 
Axis nationals and had vigilantly tried to suppress all clandestine 
radio transmitters. The Castillo government also stated that it had 
established both a 'state of siege' and a special organization on 
riVigilance and Repression of' Anti-Argentine Activitiee" which was 
42Herron, Letters, P• 295. 
43Arthur P. Whitaker, "The Inter-American System,"· Inter-American 
Affairs: An Annual Survey, I (1942), 25. 
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designed to control any activity detrimental to the country or to 
democratic institutions. These measures did not satisfy the United 
States which considered them as either patently limited or laxly en-
forced. 'Anti-Argentine' could include pro-Allied criticism of Argen-
tina's neutrality.44 
In its dealing with Chile to control Axis actions, the State 
Department elected to circumvent regular diplomatic channels "in view 
of our doubts as to the discretion of Chilean officials~ n45 Instead 
the United States secretly dispatched undercover agents to that South 
American country in order to locate and eliminate any Axis espionage. 46 
Since the United States was still haggling with Chile over the sever-
ance of relations and military assistance, it had no need to press for 
a control over espionage activity. If the Roosevelt administration 
could have persuaded Santiago to halt diplomatic relations, it would 
have also removed from Chile the center of much anti-American activity. 
Welles' Boston speech, however, removed the secrecy from the desire of 
the United States to limit espionage in the Western Hemisphere, 
Not only did the Under Secretary of State's speech add publicity, 
but it also marked a change in the United States methods. Prior to the 
speech, the Roosevelt administration tried to secure Argentine and 
Chilean cooperation by one-to-one negotiations. After Sumner Welles 
spoke of the danger to all the American countries inherent in the 
44Foreign Relations, ~' V, 201-206. 
45Ibid., P• 198. 
46Ibid,, V, 198; VI, 15, 16; U.S., Congress, Senate, Expenditures 
~ Commitments E1l ~United States Government in ~ for Latin 
America, Sen. Doc, 132, 78th Cong~, 1st sess., 1943, P• 33. 
policy of Argentina and Chile, the United States changed from a bi-
lateral to a multilateral approach of applying inter-American coercion. 
According to Cordell Hull, the United States had "close relations with 
the other American Republics, enhanced by Lend-Lease operations, and 
we could join with them in bringing pressu~ to bear on the Argen-
tine.1147 The United States justified this approach in that "Mr. Welles' 
recent public remarks • • • were made only after this Government had 
sought to avail itself of all other means of obtaining the cooperation 
of Chile and Argentina. 1148 
The vehicle through which the American republics would apply their 
pressure was the E~ergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense 
which the Rio conference had established to coordinate the hemisphere's 
anti-subversive measu,res. With its headquarters in Montevideo, the 
committee had representatives from only seven of the twenty-one 
American republics. By the principle of joint representation, each 
member would represent the American republics as a whole and not the 
particular government which appointed him. The only function of the 
seven countries-Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, United States, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela-was to provide background information to the 
committee through their selected delegates.49 Early in the life of the 
committee, the Argentine delegate armounced a reservation to a Brazilian 
proposal recolill'llending that Axis nationals register with the government 
47Hull, Memoirs, II, 14100 
48Foreisn Relations, ~' V, 217. 
49carl B. Spaeth, "The Emergency Advisory Committee for Political 
Defense," The American Journal of International Law, XIX (April, 1944), 
222-224. ...,........ . . . 
42 
of the country in which they resided. Believing that the delegate 
was acting upon instructions from Argentina, the United States claimed 
that the Argentine was representing only his government's view and 
thus violating the committee's fundamental concept of representation. 50 
Despite this defense of the validity of joint representation, the United 
States continued to send definite instructions to its appointed dele-
gate on the Committee for Political Defense, Carl Spaeth.5l The United 
States, however, did not wish to haye the committe~ engage in any 
multilateral exchange of intelligence information lest the Axis agents 
obtain it through the committee.52 In applying this policy, the United 
States refused to send Spaeth appropriate background information for the 
committee's use.53 Since the United States had agreed to provide such 
information to the committee, it was not fulfilling its inter-Arrerican 
duties. Regarding the principle of joint representation, the Roosevelt 
administration was not practicing what it was preaching to Argentina. 
Utilizing this inter-American organization to bring pressure upon 
the recalcitrant republics, the United States began amassing support 
within the committee during October. 54 On November 1, immediately 
after Chile announced the convening of its congress, 55 Secretary of 
State Hull ordered Ambassador Dawson in Uruguay to present documented 
50Foreign Relations, ~ V, 76-77. 
5libid., PP• 77, 7$, 84, 105. 
52Ibid., P• 78. 
53Ibid., PP• 94-95. 
54Ibid., P• 217. 
55New York Times, October 2S, 1942. 
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evidence on esp:ionage in Chile to Alberto Guani, the Uruguayan foreign 
minister and chairman of the Committee for Political Defense. Following 
his instructions, the ambassador requested that the Uruguayan diplomat 
make public a secret memorandum which the United States had presented to 
Chile on June 30. This communication detailed the extent of Axis 
espionage on Chilean soil and the aid such activity was receiving from 
the German, Japanese, and Italian embassies. 56 This would serve the 
triple purpose of placing the weight of hemispheric opinion against 
Chile, complying with demands that the United States prove the state-
ments uttered by Welles, and pressuring the Chilean congress to break 
relations. 57 Guani balked at publicizing a document one American 
nation had presented to another without the permission of both nations 
and at armouncing the contents without a formal committee hearing. 
The United States compromised and agreed to have Spaeth present the 
matter before the committee as being a copy he received. On November 
3, after four hours of heated debate, the Committee on Political De-
fense agreed to publicize the memorandum by a vote of five affirmatives, 
one negative from Chile, and one abstention from Argentina. A few weeks 
later, the committee considered and passed another resolution which 
recommended that the presidents of the nineteen American republics 
which had severed relations jointly urge Chile and Argentina to termi-
nate diplomatic relations with the Tripartite powers.5$ Since neither 
the publication of the memorandum nor the joint appeal fulfilled the 
original purpose of the committee, the United States altered an inter-
56Forei$,..n Relations, 1942, V, PP• 100..-101. 
57Ibid"'' VI, 36. 
5Bibid., v, p. 100~105. 
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American committee to coerce Chile, This pressure joined with Chile's 
own investigation of the North American allegations and with the lure 
of economic assistance to cause Chile to sever diplomatic relations 
with the Axis in January, 1943. 
The North Arrerican republic utilized the same principle of employ-
ing the weight of hemispheric opinion in its dealings with Argentina. 
The day after the publication of the Chilean memorandum the United 
States presented to the Buenos Aires government a note, similar to the 
one published on Chile, documenting extensive Axis activities in 
Argentina. In delivering the document, the United States ambassador 
declared that his government reserved the right to publicize any or all 
parts of the· message, but would wait to see if Argentina acted upon the 
information. 59 Wishing to prevent publication, the Argentines argued 
that they were taking all necessary and possible legal steps. The 
Buenos Aires government also pointed out that the only accomplishment 
of publication would be "increased bad feeling against Argentiria 
within the United States and within the other American Republics."60 
Joining action to its argument, the Castillo government promptly elimi-
nated the espionage which the memorandum indicated• This measure of 
cooperation was insufficient for the Secretary of State, who wrote to 
the ambassador in Buenos Aires that "even though the Argentine Govern-
ment takes steps now to clean up all of the activities described in 
our memorandum, the situation will still be totally unsatisfactory 
unless the Argentine Government [under Castillo], utilizing all of the 
59Ibido, PP• 231-232, 
60rbide, P• 234. 
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information which it has, undertakes on its own initiative to stamp 
out all of the Axis activities today going on in Argentina. • 
The Argentine government believed that it was taking the initiative and 
any publicity of the memorandum's contents would cause the Axis agents 
to take cover and thus hinder their capture.62 ~he Argentine logic 
failed to impress the United States which requested on January 1, 1943, 
that the Committee for Political Defense publish the document. The 
United States thus had "benefited by withholding publication of the 
memoranda and therefore influencing Argentina to act through the threat 
of publication, 1163 but published the document anyway to mobilize public 
opinion in the hemisphere to force Argentina to break relations. 64 
Whj,le the United States was attempting to persuade Argentina and 
Chile to sever relations or to control subversion, it was also trying 
to terminate commerci~ wireless communication from Buenos Aires and 
Santiago to Tok.yo, Berlin, and Rome. 65 In this effort, the Roosevelt 
administration could join its diplomacy with the influence of North 
American companies which held substantial interests in the tele-
communication circuits. Controlling the commercial facilities in both 
Argentina and Chile, an A.E.F.Go trust (American, English, French, 
German) operated through its Argentine subsidiary Transradio Inter-
61Ibido, P• 240. 
62rronically, Argentina was using the same argument that was the 
basis for United States opposition to multilateral exchange of intel-
ligence information through the Committee for Political Defense. 
63Foreign Relations, ~' V, 254. 
64Ibid., PP• 258, 260. 
65Bowers, Chile Through Embassy Windows, PP• 101-102. 
Chilena. While this consortium controlled the majority of the out-
standing stock in the Argentina company, the Argentina public held both 
a significant minority of the stock and a majority of the outstanding 
loans. In a different position, Transradio Chilena had no outstanding 
indebtedness and only an insignificant number of shares in the hands 
of Chilean nationals. To sever the lucrative trans-Atlantic communi-
cations would incur the enmity of those Argentines who had capital 
invested in the company. The Italian and German membership on .the 
consortium committee controllj,ng Transradio Internacional Argentina 
would immediately pressure their governments to obtain the restoration 
of the facilitiee. Although the absence of Chilean monetary interest 
in Transradio Chilena simplified the problem, the Axis powers could 
consider the terrrd.nation of telecommunication as an 'unfriendly act' 
and succeed in threatening Chile to keep the lines opened. Finally, 
since all other American nations had severed wireless communications 
with the Tripartite powers by the end of the Rio conference, the 
growing importance of each subst.ciiary ·appealed to, both Chile.an and . 
Argentine nationalism. 66 Complicating the matter further, the British 
interests also did not wish to lose the profitable links. These 
varying financial and political interests created a complex situation 
with which the United States had to deal. 
The simplest method to break these communication ties would have 
been to convince the respective Latin American countries to announce 
the severance of telecommunications. When the United States approached 
66Foreisn. Relations, ~. y, 110-114. 
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each government in the summer of 1942 with the proposal., both 
countries politely re.fu.sed. Argentina maintained that the closing the 
circuits to Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo would be i.neffective as long as the 
links were open to such neutral nations as Sweden, Spain, and Switzer-
land. 67 The United States rejected Chile's counterproposal that it 
forbid the German, Italian, and Japanese missions to use cipher or 
code in communicating with their respective governments. 68 Merely 
using the United States corporate influence to order the Latin American 
communication subsidiaries not to accept messages destined for the 
Axis nations would not be a permanent solution. Such a refusal would 
violate the concessions which Argentina and Chile had given to the 
consortium in l9ZL· These concessions, based upon the right of a 
nation to regulate its public service, stipulated that the concession-
aires could not establish or te:rmi.nate circuits without the permission 
of the respect:Lve government. To disregard a provision of the con-
cession would provide either countcy with a legal basis to assume 
operation of the subsidiary and to reestablish the brolten circuits.69 
Given these circumstances, the United States embarked upon a two-pronged 
policy: "positive joint action by the British and United States con-
sortium trustees under the direction of their respective governments"70 
and the procurement of Argentine and Chilean acceptance of the decision 
67Ib"d l. • ' P• llS-123. 
66rbid., P• 122. 
69Ib"d 
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70ibid,, P• 127, 
48 
of the American economic interests. 71 
The double thrust of the North American action toward Chile began 
on September 9 with a meeting in the State Department. The partici-
pants decided that the United States corporations should order its 
representatives at the board of the director's meeting to obtain the 
refusal of Transradio Chilena to accept any communications destined 
for the Axis nations. Britain's representative on the board would 
follow the United States lead. To prepare the Chilean government for 
the termination at the next board meeting in early October, the State 
Department obtained the aid of the Brazilian ambassador in Santiago. 72 
These two diplomats reiterated to the Chilean officials previous 
warnings that the continuation of these communications endangered the 
safety and security of the Western Hemisphere. 73 As the board meeting 
approached, an analysis showed that the Allies had only three of seven 
votes for cutting telecommunications. The deciding votes rested in 
the hands of the two Chilean directors. To obtain their votes, the 
North American representative informed each member, "I understand that 
all supplies for Transradio Chilena will be cut off if it continues to 
maintain its circuits with the Axis. 1174 Realizing that North American 
electronic supplies were the life blood of the company, the Chilean 
board members urged their foreign office to reach an agreement with the 
71Ibid., P• 135. 
72rbid.' PP• 145-147. 
73Ibid.' PP• 118, 119, 123. 
74Ibid., p. J,.Z7 ~ 
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United States. As a result, the Chilean· foreign office again proposed 
the once rejected offer to prohibit the transmission of codef;l and 
ciphers outside of the hemisphere.75 This time, however, the United 
States accepted the offer, realizing that it would effectively prevent 
the Axis mission from contacting their governments through neutral 
countries.76 The United States, therefore, obtained a partial, although 
acceptable, break in commercial communications through its use of North 
American corporate investments and threats of economic reprisal. 
Regarding Argentina, the State Department prepared a telegram 
instructing the North American member of the board of Transradio Argen-
tina to secure the company's refusal to accept messages bound for Axis 
nations.77 This goaJ,.., however, was secondary to securing the election 
of a United States citizen as manager of the Argentine subsidiary. In 
such a capacity, he could prevent the misuse of the company's facili-
ties. Yet, not until October 9 did a vote of £our to three elect a 
United States national as president of the company. 78 Since this 
occurred on the same day as Chile's ban on coded messages, the State 
Department altered its original desire to one of obtaining a similar 
restriction on coded messages going outside of the hemisphere.79 
Manipulation within the subsidiary's governing committee, diplomatic 
entreaties, and .what the United States ambassador called the "salutary 
75Ibid.' P• 159. 
76Ibid., P• 166. 
??Ibid., P• 145· 
7Sib. d 
J. • ' PP• 157, 163. 
79Ibid.' p. 166. 
effect" of the North African invasion produced a decree from the 
Castillo government. 80 By the pronouncement of December 3, 1942, 
Argentina limited the Axis missions to sending one hundred code words 
per day to destinations outside of the Western Hemisphere. 81 The 
United States, therefore, achieved only a modified success in its 
desire to deny the Axis agents wireless communication. 
The United States push to tenninate telecommunications was part 
50 
of the total policy aimed at convincing Argentina and Chile to cooper-
ate fully with the Allies. This policy was based upon the fact that a 
vast majority of the Argentine and Chilean populace favored the Allied 
cause against fascism. The United States government held that the 
Castillo administration was pro-Axis and suppressing the will of the 
democratic Argentines. 82 More tolerant of Chile, the Roosevelt 
administration felt that the strictly neutral policy of the South 
American republic was also contradicting the wishes of the Chileans. 83 
This governmental analysis failed to appreciate correctly that both 
countries were following pro-Allied neutrality. Each had declared that 
the United States was classified as a non-belligerent under its 
neutrality laws. Argentina and Chile also continued to trade with the 
North American republic. The Roosevelt administration should have 
understood the rationale of this course since it had pursued a similar 
non-belligerency toward Britain before Pearl Harbor. 
80Ibid., P• 174. 
81Ib"d 178 i •' P• ' 
82 Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (New York: Harper and 
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This kind of neutra.l;i.ty was appropriate for both Chile and 
Argentina. The Chilean government re.fleeted the mood of its citizens 
in fearing for its major industries and cities on or near its unpro-
tected coast. The Chilean voters selected ~s in the election on the 
platform of favoring the democracies without severing relations. 
Argentina's economy depended upon its exports. With only two dozen 
ships in its merchant marine, its national interest dictated that all 
efforts, inclu,ding neutrality, be expended to save every ship. 84 The 
United States, therefore, unfairly judged Argentina's and Chile's 
positions. 
This misconception that the governments of Argentina and Chile 
were suppressing the will of their people filtered down to the citizen-
ry of the United States. In its interpretation of the news, Time 
magazine maintained that the Castillo government was pro-Axis. 85 
Joining~' such widely diverse magazines as Collier's, HaU?er's 
Magaz;ne, and~ Nation gave their commentaries the same bias. 86 The 
youth of the United States also received this point of view through 
.·,<I 
8~anuel Seoane, "Castillo is not Argentina,'' The Nation, CLVI 
(January 2, 1943), PP• 12-13. 
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86see Frank Gervasi, "Argentina, Axis Gateway," Collier's, April 
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Senior Scholastic. 87 The only major publication that attempted to 
explain the policy of Argentina as pro-Allied neutrality was Christian 
Centuiy. 88 This last journal had a weekly circulation of 29,177 com-
pared to 2,909,794 for Collier's, 106,846 fo·r Ha;a>er's MMazine, 
33,169 for The Nation, 347,612 for Senior Scholastic, and 842,122 for 
~.89 From these facts, the An:erican people had ample reason to 
believe that Argentina and Chile were nests of Nazi influence. 
Reviewing the North American policy toward Chile and Argentina 
from the Rio Conference to the invasion of North Africa, the economic 
influence moved the f\lll circle. In the North American republic's 
desire to have Argentina and Chile join the other Latin American 
republics in severing diplomatic relations with the Tripartite powers, 
the United States tried to lure the two hesitant countries with pros-
pects of economic assistance in the form of military hardware. When 
this failed, the Roosevelt administration used the club of inter-
American opinion that the economic influence of the United States had 
forged. Finally, to lessen the harmful effects of the Tripartite 
diplomats, the United States employed the influence of North American 
corporate investments in Latin America. Although the economic aspect 
87 See "Argentina Clings to Neutrality," Senior Scholastic, 
September 14, 1942, PP• 14-15; "Facts Behind the Story," Senior 
Scholastic, October 12, 1942, pp. 14-15; "Relations With Axis Argued 
in Argentina," Senior Scholastic, October 26, 1942, PP• 14-15. 
88See "Is Argentina Pro~azi?" Christian Century, LlX (February 
4, 1942), 132; J. Dexter Montgomery, "Argentina Holds Her Neutrality," 
Christian Century, LIX (May 27, 1942), 701. 
89 J 9 Percy H. Johnson, ed., N.• !£• ~ !ill! ~ Directory 2! 
Newspapers and Periodicals, 1942 (Philadephia: N. W. Ayer and Sons, 
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emerges in different ways, it is definitely present in all the major 
developments of the foreign relations of the United States with 
Argentina and Chile during this period. Despite these attempts at 
economic pressure, the States failed to convi,nee Argentina or Chile to 
break diplomatic relations by the time the Allied a:nnies invaded North 
Africa. These two South American countries were alone in the Western 
Hemisphere in their refusal to give full political cooperation to the 
United States. 
CHAPTER III 
DEFENSIVE COOPERATION 
While Chile and Argentina were not eligible in 1.942 ;for military 
assistance due to th~ir f'oreign policy, the ~maining eight South 
American countrtes had f'ul.filled the f:i,rst p:rerequisite of such aid by 
terminating relations with the Tripartite powers. Under the Lend-Lease 
Act of March 11, 1941, Congress authorized the President, "when he deems 
it in the interest of national defense, ••• to sell, transfer title 
to, e:x:change, lease, lend or otherwise dispos.e of • • • any defense 
article" to the government "of any country whose defense the President 
deems vital to the defense o.f the 'United States,"1 In 1941, the 
President had declared that all Western Hemispheric countries were 
"vital" -to North American defense and had instructed the State Depart-
rnent to begin Lend-Lease negotiations with the South American re-
publics. 2 The basic obligations were that the United States would 
provide defense articles according to an established schedule based 
upon their monetary value and that the recipient country would pay over 
an extended period of years a set percentage of the cost of the 
1 . 3 supp ies. 
1Aet of March 11, 194J.; 55 Stat 31. 
~ .s., Congress,: House, Re:pgrt 2!!. the First Year 2!, LenQ.'""Lease 
Ope: rations, H. Doc. 661, 77th Cong,, 2nd sess., 1942, P• 7. 
3Fore;Y:sn. Relations, 1941, VI, 139. 
By December 7, 1941, the United States had concluded Lend-Lease 
agreements with Brazil, Paraguay and Bolivia. Within the first six 
months of 1942, the State Department had renegotiated one of the pre-
war pacts and had signed new agreements with the remaining five South 
American republics. The Lend-Lease arrangements brought the South 
American countries into the defensive sphere of United Stateso 
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Relying upon the United States as their arsenal, the eight South Ameri-
can countries which had broken relations made additional .. concessions to 
the United States. 
While President Roosevelt had publicly declared in 1941 that the 
South American countries were vital to the United States defenses and 
that the delivery of arms to them was in the North American national 
interest, a clearer view of his purpose in providing arms to Latin 
America emerges in his private statements. When considering the 
possibility of a German take-over in Central America, Roosevelt told a 
Senate committee: "Properly equipped and with the lmowleqge of how to 
get the.right people to do it for us, we could stage a revolutiun in 
any Central American government for between a million and four million 
dollars. In other words, it is a matter of price., 114 In another confi-
dential prewar statement concerning armament negotiations with several 
South American countries, the President decided to "let them have a few 
dribblets" of military armaments in order to keep them 11 sweeto 115 
4From a conference between Roosevelt .and the Military Affairs 
Committee of the Senate, January .31, 1939, as quoted by Thomas H& 
Greer, What Roosevelt Thought (East Lansing, Miehe: Michigan.'. State 
Univers;ity Press, 1958), "P•- UU., 
5Roosevelt to George c. Marshall, June 24, 1940, as quoted by 
Dozer,~ We Good Neighbors?, P• 78. 
Finally, the man who personified the 'good neighbor' showed his dis-
trust of the South American governments in early 1942 when he asked 
Cordell Hull if the United States was monitoring the diplomatic com-
munications between the Latin American republics and the Nazi-occupied 
countries. 6 Despite Roosevelt's public proclamation about the neces-
sity and reality of close cooperation within the hemisphere, he felt 
that sending supplies would insure this close cooperation among the 
countries whose loyaJ,.ty he distrusted. 
During World War II, a total of $475 million in Lend-Lease aid 
cemented this cooperation.7 Of this amount, Brazil received the 
lion's share or about seventy-five per cent of the total. 8 Brazil's 
dispr<;>portionate allotment was necessary for political and military 
reasons. Within the political structure in South America, the three 
major powers are Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, Since prospects for the 
active aid of Argentina and Chile were dim, the United States needed 
the assistance and influence of the remaining South American power. 
Brazilian cooperation was also necessary because of the proximity of 
the northeastern Brazilian coast to Africa. Offensively, the United 
States could use the Brazilian bulge as a stepping stone for delivering 
materials to the fighting fronts. Soldiers and a;rrns could follow the 
route from the southern United States to the various Caribbean bases 
to northeastern Brazil to the British colonies in Africa and then to 
6 Roosevelt, FDR: His Personal Letters,II, 1271. 
............ ....._..... . ' 
7nozer, ~~~Neighbors?, P• 128. 
\echam, United States !ill! Inter-Anerican Security, P• 225. 
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Europe or Asia.9 The short distance between the Brazilian bulge and 
Axis-influenced French West Africa made Brazil's coast a prime location 
for an invasion of the Western Hemisphere. For these reasons, then, as 
Sumner Welles explained, "The President • • • decided that this mat(riel 
be given to Brazil because of considerations broader thqn purely mili-
tary which demand today the ·closest working relationshiJ? between the 
10 two Governments." 
Although the United States and Brazil had been working together on 
plans of joint defense for several years prior to the United States 
entry into the war, the harmonious wartime collaboration between the 
two nations began at the Rio conference when Brazil traded its support 
for military aid.11 In light of its prewar pledge to aid the North 
American republic in its war effort, immediately after Pearl Harbor, 
Brazil had frozen Axis cred;i.ts, closed Axis newspapers, and terminated 
telecommunications with Berlin, Tokyo, and Rome. President Getulio 
Vargas, however, cautioned that the pledge did not necessarily include 
declaring war or breaking relations.12 By leaving the door open on the 
tennination of diplomatic relations, Vargas was able to barter arms from 
the United States. A declaration breaking relations, the Brazilian 
9Hull, Memoirs, II, 1423. 
1°Foreign Relations,~' V, 651. 
1lpart of the prewar cooperation between the United States and 
Brazil included stationing marine battalions on the strategically im-
portant Brazilian bulge. For a complete account of the defensive ef-
forts of the United States and Brazil, see Stetson Conn and Bryon 
Fairchild, ~ Western HemisEhere; The Framework 2£. Hemisphere Defense 
in United States Arm~ ill World !!!!:. ll '(Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1960), PP• 2 5-302. 
12Ib'd 1 ., P• 303. 
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president argued, would lead to a war with the Axis for which Brazil 
was not militarily prepared.13 Not only would danger be lurking across 
the seas, it would also be just across Brazil's southern border. lf 
Brazil severed relations and Argentina c:D.d not, Axis activity would in-
crease in Argentina and could lead to an incursion against Brazil for 
which the Vargas government al.so was not prepared.14 As additional arms 
would remedy Brazil's difficulty, Vargas met on January 17 with Welles 
and offered to sever relations if the United States would dispatch 
matt'riel to Brazil's army and navy, Demanding more than the token ship-
men.ts of the Lend-Lease agreement of October 1, 1941, the Brazilian chief 
of state wanted airplanes, tanks, and coastal. artillery necessary to the 
defense of Brazil. Two da,ye later, the North American di.plomat ex-
plained to Vargas that Roosevelt had authorized the requested defense 
articles.15 With this encouragement, Brazil severed relations at the 
conclusion of the conference and embarked upon a course of enthusiastic 
cooperation •. In return, the Unit.ed:,States pursued, in the words of one 
State Department official., a policy of "Be nice to Brazil."16 
The scarcity of defense articles in the United States el.most termi-
nated the joint defense effort before it began in earnest. Under the 
mechanics of the Lend-Lease ad.m:i.n:istration, the Combined Munitions 
Assignment Board allocated defensive supplies to areas according to 
l3Foreign Relations, 1942, V, 634., 
14Ibid, , P• 37 • 
15Ibid., PP• 635-636. 
16Roland Hall Sharp, So-u.th .America Uncensored (New York.: Longmans, 
Green and Co., 1945), P• 5. 
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military priorities.17 Weighing the needs of Brazil against those of 
the countries actually fighting, the Board would not approve in early 
February immediate shipments to Brazil. Acting upon Roosevelt's belief 
that international political considerations outweighed the purely 
military, Harry Hopkins secured the immediate dispatch of fifty planes, 
twenty light tanks, and four anti-aircraft guns.18 To secure further 
cooperation, the United States and Brazil renegotiated the Lend-Lease 
agreement of October 1, 1941, and signed a new pact on March 3, 1942. 
The United States pledged to provide $200 million in military aid.19 
At the same time, the United States scheduled for delivery before the 
end of 1942 more than 300 tanks and a larger number of anti-tank and 
anti-aircraft batteries. 20 This massive commitment of aid created a 
receptive attitude in Brazil for further bilateral cooperation. 
The effort to secure additional concessions from Brazil began on 
February 2lo On that day, Stimner Welles instructed Jefferson Caf~ry,, 
the ambassador in Rio, to request new defense concessions for the 
United States "as soon as President Vargas is apprized of the results" 
of the new Lend-Lease agreement. 21 Following his instructions, the 
North American diplomat asked for Brazil's pennission to use the 
strategic northeastern coast for the stationing of additional United 
States troops, the building of new bases, and the unrestricted flying 
l7H. Doc. 661, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., 1942, PP• 36-37. 
18Foreign Relations, ~' V, 647, 651. 
19Ibid., P• 816. 
20conn and Fairchild, Framework 2f Hemisphere Defense, P• 316. 
21Foreign Relations, ~ V, 648. 
\ 
60 
of North American military airplanes. The United States argued that 
these concessions would improve the movement of planes, troops, and 
supplies from the southern part of the United States to the European 
and Southeast Asian theaters. The proposals received quick approval on 
March 9, just six days after the signing of the comprehensive Lend-Lease 
program. 22 Since Brazil was more interested ip gaining the Lend-Lease 
supplies than in transporting equipment to Europe, the additional 
military aid secured new concessions from Brazil in the joint defense 
arrangements. 
On April 5, the two countries concluded a new defense arrangement 
which altered the nature of the prior cooperation, Before this pact, 
the United States had dispatched its own armed forces to defend the 
exposed coast from Axis aggression. The new pact called for the joint 
defense of the area with the United States instructing, training, and 
supplying the Brazilian forces. To coordinate this bilateral effort, 
the arrangement also established the Joint Brazil-United States Defense 
Commission. 23 When Brazil declared war upon the A;xis in August, 1942, 
following submarine attacks on its shipping, the new defensive relation-
ship remained. The only result from Brazil's new belligerent status 
was the Brazilian military became more overt in their cooperation with 
the United States. 24 
Brazil's declaration of war, however, prompted one minor complica-
tion. Since the sinking of Brazilian ships had precipitated the state 
22conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, P• 317. 
23Guerrant, Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Polic¥, P• 186. 
24conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 324. 
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of war, Brazil included with its declaration of war an embargo on every 
ship in a Brazilian port. T.o persuade the Rio government to lift the 
embargo,. the Roosevelt administration offered increased submarine pro-
tection which included two P-C boats or 173~foot submarine chasers. 
When the Munitions Board threatened to prevent the export of these 
ships, President Roosevelt personally intervened again to break the 
priority impasse. His brief order was in a memorandum saying, "The 
transfer of two P-C boats • • • is , • • serious from our own operating 
point of view but this is a matter of international relations which has 
to be gone through with regardless of the purely military desirabili-
ties.1125 This minor incident again shows that:the purpose of United 
States military aid to Bra~il was to gain the cooperation of the Vargas 
government. 
With the other seven South American countries which had terminated 
diplomatic relations with the Axis powers, the United States had less 
comprehensive Lend-Lease agreements and less e~enf;live joint defense 
efforts. Of these countries, Colombia, under the leadership of Eduardo 
Santos, was one of' the most cooperative. In the same spirit which led 
Colombia to break relations immediately following Pearl Harbor, the 
Colombian minister of foreign relations asked the United States am-
bassador "what steps the United States believed Colombia should take i,n 
the matter of hemisphere defense.1126 In its answer, the United States 
requested that Santos' government permit military observers to enter 
Colombia. These military men, bearing the title of "Assistants to the 
25Roosevelt, FDR: His Personal Letters, II, 1342. 
--- ~ .. 
26Foreip;n Relations, ~' VI, 141. 
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Consul," would attach themselves to consulates, wear civilian dress, 
and endeavor to avoid attention as United States military personne1. 27 
Receiving an affirmative reply to this request, the North American 
government also wanted a Colombianliaisonofficer stationed in Panama 
with the United States Caribbean Defense Command. Holding the highest 
rank possible, he would have a carte blanche to permit the United States 
to take emergency action within Colombia's territory or territorial 
waters. While agreeing verbally, President Santos did not want the 
arrangement in a written document because such broad authority violated 
Colombia's constitution. This breach of constitutional law was similar 
to Santos' earlier concession allowing the United States to fly planes 
over Colombian territory without the consent of the Colombian 
28 
congress. 
Although the cooperation of the Santos' government was voluntary, 
two series of negotiations were occurring simultaneously with these 
concessions. On March 17, 1942, S'umner Welles and the Colombian am-
bassador climaxed Lend-Lease discussions when they signed an agreement 
which granted Colombia $16 million in military aid, 29 Other conver-
sations concerned the Agricultural Mortgage Bank of Colombia, the 
second largest governmental bank, which had defaulted on $10 million in 
securities which United States citizens held. During late 1941 and 
early 1942, the North American government had used its good offices to 
secure the successful settlement finally reached in early March. 30 The 
27Ib"d 1 ., PP• 142-143. 
28Ibid., PP• 145-152. 
29Ibid., P• 190. 
30rbid., PP• 204-219. 
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importance of the $10 million debt and the $16 million in Lend-Lease aid 
becomes apparent when compared with Colombia's total national budget 
in 1941 of slightly more than $45 million. 31 In addition, the United 
States agreed to patrol the Goajira peninsula because, as the American 
ambassador said, "of the large number of requests which we are con-
tinually making of the Colombian Government on military and naval 
matters."32 Although the government of Eduardo Santos, which left 
office on August 7, 1942, did not trade its cooperation with the 
United States military defenses for economic advancement, the incentive 
for econQmic and milit~ry assistance is not toa.J,ly absent. 
After President Alfonso Lcfpez Pumarejo succeeded Santos in August, 
Colombia's enthusiastic vo+unteeting somewhat lessened. Believing that 
Santos should have acted with the consent of the legislature, the new 
administration sought senate approval of the previous rights granted to 
the United States. This time, however, td'pez asked for and received 
permission for military and naval observers since the subterfuge of the 
"Assistants to the Consuls" had become known. The main development in 
defensive cooperation during the latter half of 1942 was the United 
States desire for a naval base at Cartagena on Colombia's northern 
coast. In addition to the station's role in defending the Panama Canal, 
the United States argued that the base would help protect Colombian 
shipping and thus protect Colombia's economic stability. When the 
LdPez government did not readily accede, the State Department offered 
to provide air transportation from Cartagena to the off-shore islands as 
31 Sen. Doc. 132, 7Sth Cong., 1st sess., 1943, P• 33. 
32Foreign Relations, ~' VI, 150. 
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a auid pro .9Y.Q. .for the base ).3 The announcements of the naval base and 
the air transport service were issued separately since, according to an 
informant in the Colombian foreign office, "for internal reasons he 
[L&°pez] does not wish to have the two projects coming too closely 
associated •••• 11 .:34 Although the United States still had the coopera-
tion of' the ColombiS?l government after tcfpe~' inauguration, such 
collaboration was more difficult to obtain. 
Peru and the United States completed the joint defense arrange-
ments in early 1942. In exchange for military aid, the government of 
President Manuel Prado lent the United States a naval-air station and 
allowed United States armed forces to enter Peru. On February 4, when 
the United States had proposed to give four coastal batteries to Chile, 
it had also offered to Peru one battery to guard the exposed Talara oil · 
fields and refineries, Not only did these petroleum facilities provide 
the only aviation fuel in western South Anerica, they also supplied 
fuel for Chile's copper ;industry, Consequently on March S, the battery 
arrived with appro.Jdmately .300 American soldiers to train the Peruvian 
anny in its u.se. As part of this gift, Peru would permit the United 
States to use Talara as a base for Pacific air patrols.35 As soon· as 
the Peruvian military had mastered the use of the guns, Washington 
would turn them over to Lima as part of the Lend-Lease agreement of' 
March ll, 1942. Including the coastal battery, the United States would 
.33lbid., PP• 155-16.3. 
34Ibid. , P• 161. 
35conn and Fairchild, Framework 2!, Hem?-sphere Defense, pp. 202-203. 
provide Peru with military aid amounting to $29 million.36 The 
catalyst, therefore, for incorporating Peru into the American defense 
system was the provision for armaments. 
Venezuela's defensive collaboration included elements of the 
arrangements which the United States was making with Colombia and 
Peru. While the North American republic was senc;ti.Jlg coastal batteries 
to Chile and Peru, it also sent a similar set of defense guns to Vene-
zuela to guard the vital petroleum industry on Venezuela's northern 
coast. 37 Besides permitting JOO American soldiers to man these guns, 
Venezuela also agreed to send a high-ranking officer to Panama as a 
liaison officer to the Caribbean .Defense Command. To guard further 
Venezuelan oil, Caracas allowed the .. stationing of three United States 
marine battalions at Barcelona and the unrestricted flying of American 
military planes over its territory.JS As Venezuela was granting these 
concessions, the two governments completed the negotiations of Lend-
Lease aid and signed on March 18, 1942, an agreement which gave that 
South American country $15 million in army and navy aid. As additional 
assistance, the United States built and staffed a military, a navy, and 
an air force academy. The Venezuelan military, which played an ;important 
role in domestic politics and in the country's tradition, placed a 
36Foreign Relations, ~' VI, 673,. 
37rn mid-January, the American military had promised to provide 
three such batteries. When the offer of one arrived in February, 
Venezuela hesitated in accepting lest the possibility of receiving the 
other two endo However, a German submarine attack upon the island of 
Aruba prompted the acceptance of the one battery G Conn and Fairchild, 
Framework 2f Hemisphere Defense, PP• 203-204. 
38Foreign Relations, 1942, VI, 735-740. The pennission for flights 
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missiono Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, po 263. 
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tremendous amount of importance upon these academies.39 While the naval 
part of the Lend-Lease aid provided anti ... submarine patrols, the United 
States' military assistance programs secured the tangible benefits of 
such patrols, in addition to permission to build bases, to use the 
harbors, and to fly military planes above Venezuelan territory. 40 
The government of Ecuador's President Carlos Arroyo cooperated 
with the United States in providing military bases at Salinas and in 
the Galapagos Islands. Early in the war, Ecuador had permitted the 
United States to occupy the Pacific archipelago protecting the western 
approach to the Panama Canal. Ecuador, lacking adequate military 
forces with which to guard the islands, wanted the United States to 
occupy the islands to prevent them from falling into Japanese ~.ands. 
Regarding the base at Salinas on the peninsul,a which guarded Guayaquil 
Bay, the two governments had negotiated a written agreement whereby 
the United States would pay all expenses and Ecuador would retain legal 
ownership. The United States would have a center for Pacific air 
patrols, and Ecuador would have protection of its major seaporto41 
The two countries, however, had not negotiated an arrangement for the 
/ . Galapagos bases. Al though Arroyo had privately granted verbal per-
mission to the United States to occupy them, he refused to sign a 
written pact until both countries had concluded a Lend-Lease agreement 
and unt.il the United States had provided an outline of materials 
immediately available. Wanting to have a written contract to avoid 
39Isa(as Medina Angarita, Cu.atro A!i'.os de Democracia (Caracas: 
Pensamiento Viva C.A., Editores, 1963},Pp:-139-14.0, 145• 
4~echam, United States ~Inter-American Security, P• 226. 
41Forei5n R.elations, ~' VI, 366-368. 
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the charge of an illegal military occupation, the United States com-
plied with Arroyo's desires. On April 6, Quito and Washington signed 
a highly favorable Lend-Lease pact that stipulated that Ecuador would 
pay only 3.53 per cent of the cost of $17 million in defense articles.42 
In the summer of 1942, negotiations regarding the Galapagos deadlocked 
over a conflict between the war Department and the Ecuadorian Senate. 
In a partial solution to the impasse, President Arroyo announced in 
September that the United States had been occupying the Gallpagos 
Islands for the past nine months. The announcement preceded the 
formal termination of the negotiations until October, 1943.43 In 
spite of the failure to conclude a contract, Ecuador had successfully 
parlayed the United States desire to use the islands into both North 
American protection of them as well as an advantageous Lend-Lease 
agreement. 
The predominantly Indian nation o.( Bolivia, through no fault of 
... -;:. •', 
; 
its own, failed in its attempt to trade additional arms for cooperation 
in a joint defense arrangement with the United States. Through a Lend-
Lease contract signed on the eve of Pearl Harbor, the North American 
government promised to send to Bolivia at least $3 million during 1942. 
Already having this pledge of military assistance, the Bolivian dele-
gation of the Rio conference pressed for and secured economic aid.44 
Immediately following the conference, the Penaranda government reverted 
to wanting increased military aid when it tried to obtain avaiation 
42Ib.d 
l. • ' PP• 371-382. 
43Ibid., PP• 378, 379. 
44Forei.gn Relations, 12£_, VI, 428-433. 
68 
assistance. In presenting the reasons for the needed material, the 
Bolivian diplomats stressed the possibility of a carrier-based attack 
upon Bolivia's mining industry. The Bolivians al.so pointed to the 
advantages of an air-base which, by virtue of Bol:i,via's central loca-
tion, would have easy access to both coasts and to any country in South 
America. When the State Department failed to see any strategic value 
in Bolivia and indicated that it was unable to supply the requested 
aid, the La Paz government offered to give the United States bases in 
its country. This additional gesture was also ineffective as Washing-
ton reduced the Lend-Lease appropriation for 1942 to $1 nrlJ.lion. 
Despite Bolivia's efforts, the United States rejected all proposals for 
a blanket increase in military aid. 
The Roosevelt administration, however, did grant some token 
concessions to Bolivia in defensive areas, Despite the extreme scarcity 
of airplanes, the State Department agreed to substitute aircraft for 
more available supplies in order to restrain Bolivia from selling any 
of its military equipment to a third party. This pledge halted Argen-
tina's plans to purchase from the Bolivian army some old transport 
planes and establish commercial. air service in eastern Bolivia. 
Washingten opposed this Argentine. proposal because a new airline could 
be the first step toward Argentine rivalry for United States purchases 
of raw rubber in eastern Bolivia. Any new air service, furthermore, 
would compete with an airline in which the North American government 
and the Pan American corporation had a direct financial interest. 
After cutting Bolivia's quota of military suPPlies to one-third of the 
original pledge, the United States lessened the effect by re.funding 
Bolivia's payment for the materiai.45 Since men were more available 
than military equipment in 1942, the United States also agreed in 
August to send army instructors to sup~lement the aviation mission.46 
The Penaranda government was unable to increase its military assistance 
primarily because Bolivia did not have anything which would ~d the 
United States defensive needs. While the substitution of aviation 
material for military supplies was intended to thwart Argentina designs 
in eastern Bolivia, the token defensive aid.was, according to the 
American charge in La Paz, sent to ''bolster rnorale of weak Bolivian 
Government and people and might have salutary influence on Chile and 
Argentina. 1147 
Besides lacking strategic importance, Paraguay could not even 
claim the production of vital raw materials when it contended for de-
fensive aid from the United States. Despite these deficiencies, the 
Roosevelt administration understood the tremendous influence which 
Argentina exerted upon neighboring Paraguay. Geopolitically, Argentina 
borders Paraguay on tnree sides. Economically, its influence is even 
greater. Paraguay's main commercial avenue with the world in the 
Paraguay-Paranl which flows for hundreds of miles through Argentine 
territory. The steamship companies which navigate the river are 
Argentine owned and operated. The Argentine government owns the pre-
dominant interest in the Paraguayan Central Railroad, which is the only 
45Foreign Relations, 1942, VI, 526-536. 
46u .s., Department of State, Militarz Mission: Agreement Between 
The United States of America and Belina, Executive Agreement Series 
NO:- 267 (August 11-;-1942), p.-Y:-
47Foreign Relations, ~' V, 516. 
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major railroad in the country. / The Par~uayan guarani, the monetary 
unit, is tied to the Argentine peso and enters the international money 
market through Buenos Aires.48 Confronted with this strong influence 
by the non-cooperative Argentines, the Roosevelt administration could 
offset this dominance through military aid. 
With Argentina always lurking in the background, the United States 
increased during 1942 the amount of aviation materials it sent to 
Paraguay over the allotment scheduled in the Lend-Lease contract signed 
in late 1941. 49 After Paraguay had received several :;>mall training 
aircraft, the fliers had damaged most of them within a few months. 
The government of Higinio Morinigo in AsunciO"n convinced the United 
States to furnish replacements or to pay the repair costs. When the 
Paraguayan government refused to pay for the gasoline for these planes, 
the United States agreed to increase Paraguay's Lend-Lease allotment 
to allow for the purchase of gasoline. The basis of Asuncicfn1 s argu-
ment was that "if, as part of the good neighbor policy, the United 
States was going to supply the planes, • • • [it] at least ought to 
be good neighbor enough to give ••• the gas to run them. 1150 The main 
point of negotiation between the Morinigo and Rposevelt administrations 
concerned the construction of civilian airports at Asuncio'n and Con-
cepcion. The United States paid for the development of the Asuncion 
airport in exchange for the free use of the facilities by North 
American military aircraft. Since the completion of this airport ful-
4~acDonald, Latin American Politics, P• 508. 
49Foreign Relations, ~' V, 658. 
50 2 8t 6~ Sen. Doc. 13 , 7 h Cong., 1st sess., 1943, P• o. 
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filled Paraguay's desire for a great national airport, the South Ameri-
can government refused.to provide the land for a similar arrangement 
regarding the improvement of the air faci;lities at Concepcidh. 51 
Consequently, Paraguay's increased military aid resulted from the 
United States desires to limit Argentine influence and to obtain air 
facilities for its military aircraft. 
In its defensive relations with Uruguay, the United States actions 
were based upon a Lend-Lease agreement signed on January 13, 1942. 
By this pact, the United States pledged to Uruguay $17 million in mili-
tary assistance. 52 After this pact bro~ght Uruguay into defensive 
cooperation with the United States, Uruguay half-heartedly pennitted 
the United States to build a naval-air station at Laguna Negra.53 This 
procedure of Lend-Lease aid obtaining a military concession duplicated 
the basic outline of the military cooperation of the other South Ameri-
can countries which had severed relations. 
An analysis of the wording of the preamble of the Lend-Lease 
agreements will show how the pacts brought the Latin American countries 
into the United States defensive sphere. In the introduction to the 
pacts, both signatory powers "expressed their desire to cooperate in 
the defense and maintenance of peace, the security and integrity of the 
Aroorican c~ntinent •••• 0 54 The pledge "to cooperate" prompted the 
North American country to provide the defensive articles contained in 
5lForeign Relations, ~' VI, 651-654. 
52Ibid., P• 703. 
5\ryce Oliver, "Brazil and Uruguay," in What the South Americans 
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the text of the agreement. In exchange for this specified amount of 
military aid, the Latin American governments agreed to collaborate with 
the United States in the defense of the hemisphere. The concessions 
which the South American countries made to the North American military 
were the practical implementation of this Lend-Lease pledge. 
The pacts also included an escape clause as subtle coercion to 
prevent the South American governments from failing in their collabora-
tion. The agreements allowed, "In conformity with the Act of Congress 
of the United States of America of March 11, 1941, [Lend-Lease Act] 
the United States of America reserves the right at any time to suspend, 
defer, or stop deliveries, whenever, in the opinion of the President of 
the United States of America, further deliveries are not consistent 
with the needs of the defense of the United States of America or the 
Western Hemisphere."55 Th~ South Americans understood that this was 
not an idle threat. The United States was denying aid to Chile and, 
especially, Argentina because of their lack of cooperation. If the 
North American republic terminated supplies with a non-cooperative 
country, the United States could answer any charge of economic re-
taliation with the credible reply that countries actually fighting had 
priority for the extremely scarce mate'riel. Within the Lend-Lease 
agreements, therefore, the North Arrerican pledge to deliver armaments 
accompanied the South American pledge to cooperate. If the Latin 
Americans refused to abide by their pledge, the United States could also 
retract its promises. 
In a message to Congress in the spring of 1942, President Roosevelt 
55Ibid., P• 139· 
73 
wrote, "Under the Lend-Lease Act, we send our arms and mater:Lals to the 
places where they can best be used in the battle against the Axis. 11 56 
How effective was the aid sent to South America dur:ing 1942 in fighting 
the Tripartite Powers? The Roosevelt rationale that such Lend-Lease 
assistance struggled against the Axis by defending the Western Hemis-
phere is subject to serious questioning. 
During 1942, the United States shipped $34.6 million in Lend-
Lease arms to all of Latin America. Of this amount, $17.8 million 
was aircraft and aeronautical material.57 With the notable exception 
of Brazil, because of its particular importance, no other South 
American country received during 1942 or later any medium or heavy 
airplanes. 58 Among the possible light-weight aircraft--.fighters, 
trainers, or reconnaissance ships--that the United States could have 
sent, training planes predominated in 1942. Of a total of 113 planes 
delivered to Brazil, seventy were trainers, twenty-six were bombers, 
sixteen were pursuit aircraft, and one was a twin-engine Beechcraft 
for airmail service.59 A similar emphasis on trainers was involved in 
60 the aeronautical supplies delivered to Paraguay. Of the forty-two 
56 H. Deco 661, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., 1942, P• 6. 
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light-weight aircraft allotted to Boliv;ia under Lend-Lease, all were 
training planes. 61 Because of the predominance of trainers, the direct 
function o;f aviation aid, which comprised over fifty per cent of Lend-
Lease assistance, was not to battle the Axis but to train the southern 
neighbors. Tbe South Americans were understandably interested in 
developing their domestic aviation since the geographical obstacles of 
mountains, plateaus, deserts, jungles, and non-navigable rivers have 
continuously impeded the growth of other means of transportation. 
Again with the exception of,' Brazil, the only major artillery the 
United States sent to South America were the six 155-rnillimeter coastal 
62 batteries to Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. The bulk of the Lend-Lease 
ordnance sent to Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela were small caliber machine guns, mortars, and rifies, 
These types of annaments could not protect these countries from a 
hit-and-run attack, which was the onl,y offensive maneuver that the Axis 
could effectively execute. The ;Lend .... Lease aid, therefore, did little 
to provide adequate protection of the Western Hemisphere. 
A further indication of the non-strategic purposes of Lend-Lease 
assistance is that the major and most effective defensive efforts of 
the United States were originally unconnected with Lend-Lease activi~ 
ties. The process of guarding the northeast coast of Brazil began in 
1940, many months be.fore the passage of the Lend-Lease Act. Prior to 
the signing of Lend-Lease contracts, the United States sent the six 
6~Foreign Relations, ~' V, 533, The heavy demand upon war 
materials among the Allied forces prevented all the alloted planes 
from arriving by the end of 1942. 
62conn and Fairchild, Framework 2! HemispUere Defense, P• 234. 
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coastal batteries to Chile, Peru, and Venezuela to protect the vital 
copper and petroleum industries. Since these United States actions 
were originally unassociated with Lend-Lease deliveries, the United 
States took the minimum and necessary steps for defending the vulner-
able points of the South American continent without the use of the Lend-
Lease law. 
Although the main defensive actions occurred independently of 
Lend-Lease aid, military assistance was vital in securing additional 
defensive concessions from the South Anerican nations. President 
Roosevelt did believe that the gifts of arms could gain the collabora-
tion of the South American countries. The basis for this belief is in 
the part the military plays in Latin Anerican domestic politics. 
Professor Austin McDonald summarized this role: "The governments of 
most of our southern neighbors are run by the generals. • • • The army 
almost always has the power and shows no hesitancy :Ln making it felt. 1163 
Military a$&::i;stance could gain the. cooperation of this highly influ-
ential military class. Once the Lend-Lease materiel had created a 
receptive attitude in the South American states, the United States 
could obtain additional permissions, such as to establish bases, to 
use harbors and airports, and to fly over the territory of the South 
American·republics. These concessions, however, were more conveniences 
than the original necessities established without the aid of Lend-
Lease. 
Although the United States concluded Lend-Lease agreements with 
6
.\iacDonald, Latin American Politics, p. 16. For an in depth study 
of the relationship between Latin American military and politics, see 
Edwin Lieuwen, ~~Politics in Latin America (New York: Praeger 
Press, 1960). 
76 
eight South American governments, the Roosevelt administration made no 
effort to sign Reverse Lend-Lease contracts with any South American 
country. 64 The State Department reasoned that "it would be impolite, 
unwise, and improper to expect or ask for" a Reverse Lend-Lease pact. 65 
To have done so might have endangered the collaboration which the 
original aid had obtained. If the motivating thrust of military 
assistance had been an outgrowth of hemispheric solidarity, then the 
logical result would have been the reciprocity of Reverse Lend-Lease. 
For these reasons, the United States achieved the military cooper-
ation of the South American countries through the application of the 
rewards of military aid. This collaboration was limited, with only 
Brazil actively using its anned forces for hemispheric defense. The 
remaining South American countries which had broken relations merely 
permitted the United States to use their territory and facilities for 
reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare; they refrained from com-
mitting their own soldiers to such efforts. Since the United States 
had to barter its Lend-Lease aid for this limited assistance, the 'all 
for one' concept of the Good Neighbor policy oversimplifies the process 
of defensive cooperation within the Western Hemisphere. Military 
collaboration, however, joined with the political in preparing the 
South American countries for a economically more subservient wartime 
role .. 
64conn and Fairchild, Framework £!Hemisphere Defense, P• 234. 
65Minutes of meeting between Department of State and Foreign 
Economic Administration representatives, September 16, 1943, as quoted 
by Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p, 234. 
CHAPTER IV 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
During 1942, North and South America cooperated in three major 
areas. Their political unity reached its highest state after the Rio 
conference when eight South American republics severed diplomatic 
relations. Through bilateral defense agreements, the South American 
states aided the United States in its military protection of the 
Western Hemisphere. The greatest area of collaboration, however, 
emerged in their economic relationships. The United States perpetuated 
its prewar economic programs of securing raw materials from Latin 
America, extending Export-Import Bank loans, granting economic aid, 
enforcing the blacklist, and signing reciprocal trade agreements. 
The main result of this multi-faceted economic cooperation was the 
continuation of South America's position as an economic satellite of 
the United States. Since the late nineteenth century, Latin America 
had provided raw materials for North American industry. The United 
States, in turn, shipped to Latin America consumer goods manufactured 
from the raw materials. When wartime measures of 1942 increased this 
economic dependency, highly reminiscent of colonial status, the southern 
nations accepted the subservient position because the United States 
offered immediate financial rewards o 
The war created two major problems concerning the maintenance and 
development of economic relations. The first was the inadequacy of 
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shipping facilities caused by the destruction of Allied vessels by 
Axis submarines. Aggravat:i,.ng the shortage further, the United States 
transferred merchant ships from the inter-American trade to servicing 
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the actual fighting fronts. The lack of ships was joined by a shortage 
of products which the Latin American nations needed most. In the past, 
machinery, chemicals, and iron and steel products had comprised the 
bulk of the United States exports to its southern neighbors. These 
types of goods, however, were exactly the ones which the war effort · 
required. 
To coordinate available shipping with available products, the 
United States had taken steps in 1941. to detennine the essential needs 
of the individual Western Hemispheric countries. As 1942 progressed, 
the northern republic tightened its controls over international trade 
by requiring the Board of Economic Warfare to issue licenses for all 
commercial exports. An arrangement between the Board and the War 
Shipping Administration produced a shipping priority system in August. 
A month before, the War Production-Board assumed direct control over 
all imports of' materials essential to the United States war machine. 
In addition, the Office of Price Administration established maximum 
prices for both exports and imports.1 With the North American re-
public the only country which could adequately supply the products 
necessary to.maintain the domestic Latin American economies, the power 
which these agencies exercised over United States foreign trade implied 
control over the internal economies of the South American nations, 
1George Wythe, "!ndustry, Commerce, and Finance: The United 
States and Latin America," J:nter-American Af.fairs: An ,A:pnu§l. ~urvey, 
I (1942), 74, . . . 
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Furthennore, this control was unilateral since these agencies were 
creations of only the United States government and did not engage in 
direct communication with the South American republics, 
To its credit, the United States exercised restraint in its use 
of this power and attempted to adhere to the Rio Conference recom-
mendation that all American nations cooperate "to supply such articles 
and products in quantities sufficient to prevent a scarcity thereof, 
which might bring about consequences detrimental to the economic life 
of the Amaric~ peoples.••2 In spite of its efforts, some serious 
shortages of consurrer goods, such as gasoline in Brazil and Chile, 
developed. In general, however, the trade arrangements of the 
United States served to maintain the domestic economies of the South 
American countries by providing needed consumer articles• 
This general effort contrasted with the United States policy 
toward Argentina. In dealing with that recalcitrant country, the 
United States reduced export allocations and attempted to convince 
Britain to follow suit. As the State Department explained the export 
policy, the purpose of the trade regulations was "to strengt~en so far 
as possible the national economies of those nations which have associ-
ated themselves with the objectives of the United Nations by severing 
relations."3 As a result of this discrimination, Argentina suffered 
serious shortages of necessary items. Coal supplies, for example, 
declined to such an extent that the Argentines had to burn corn in 
their industrial furnaces. 4 Shipping space for newsprint was unavail-
2world Peace Founda~ion, Docurrents, IV, 309. 
3Foreign Relations, 1942, V, 332-33.3. 
4Herron, Letters, P• 185. 
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able for pro-Axis newspapers, but available for pro-Allied ones.5 In 
these ways, the United States attempted to pressure both the nation as 
a whole and the individuals within the nation. 
The unilateral trade policies of the northern republic strengthened 
the economic power which the United States government could wield over 
the other Western Hemispheric nations. Prior to these regulations; the 
power had rested in the hands of individual North American businessmen. 
When the government assumed the decisions of what commodity should be 
sent to what country at what time, it centralized the economic control 
into its own grasp. This consolidation of economic power made the 
force more effective. Excepting Argentina, the South American 
countries did not object to this increased economic might of the United 
States because its stated purpose was to insure their own domestic 
economic stability. 
In addition to this unilateral approach, the United States also 
tried a multilateral method to gain economic collaboration. The main 
agency for this effort was the Inter-American Financial and Economic 
Advisory Committee (FEAC), which the American states had created 
before the outbreak of war. During the hostilities, the areas of its 
concern expanded to include production, markets, surpluses, finances, 
credit, transportation, communication, tourism, economic controls, 
postwar problems, and conscription. 6 Although Cordell Hull l~uded the 
FEAC as "an indispensible supplement to the all out war effort, 117 the 
5Foreign Relations, ~' V, 400-401. 
6Mecham, United States ~ Inter~mer.ican Security, pp. 235-236. 
?u.s., Department of State, Department 2f State Bulletin, Vol. 
VIII, no. 196 (March Z'/, 1943), 263. 
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committee's only power was to discuss and recommend methods of economic 
cooperation- Without the proper means of enforcement, this body 
accomplished little tangible benefit except for the propaganda value of 
inter-American unity. 
Under the auspices of the FEAC during the summer of 1942, an Inter-
Arrerican Conference on Systems of Economic and Financial Control was 
held in Washington to discuss means to control the financial activities 
which could benefit the Axis powers. At the conclusion of this meeting 
of ministers of finance and representatives of national banks, the con-
ference recommended to each country a uniform method of handling finan-
cial transactions. The conference, however, had no authority to imple-
ment the suggestions. As a result, the State Department instructed 
its diplomats in Latin America to press for the adoption of the 
recommendations by the country to which they were accredited. 8 
Although these unilateral and multilateral efforts had some value, 
the most effective means for economic cooperation were the bilateral 
arrangements. The area in which the individual Latin American 
countries could most actively cooperate was in providing strategic and 
critical raw mater:i,als. In June, 1941, the Munitions Board of the 
United States defined strategic materials as those which were essential 
to the national defense and which were not available within the con-
tinental United States. By this definition, the strategic materials 
were antimony, chromium, coconut shell tar, industrial diamonds, 
manganese, manila fiber, mercury, mica, nickel, quartz, quinine, 
rubber, silk, tin, and tungsten. In the critical category were those 
8Foreign Relations, ~' V, 58-73. 
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items which would be less difficult to obtain than strategic materials 
because large deposits existed in the United States or because they 
were less essential than strategic resources. The critical list in-
eluded aluminum, asbestos, cork, graphite, hides, copper, one hundred 
octane gasoline, iodine, kapok, opium, optical glass, phenol, nitrogen 
compounds, platinum, tanning materials, toloul, vanadium, wool, and 
zinc. 9 These substances were intrinsically vital to the United States 
war effort, and an adequate supply could mean the difference between 
victory and defeat. 
Nature had given the South American countries many of these 
essential items. Argentina possessed antimony, hides, tanning materi-
als, tungsten, and wool. The vast expanses of Brazil contained large 
deposits of bauxite, chromite, manganese, quartz, and rubber. Besides 
the main deposits of tin and tungsten, Bolivia could also provide 
antimony, rubber, and cinchona bark. The 'shoestring' republic of 
Chile had copper, nitrogen compounds, and iodine. Colombia's main 
resources were petroleum and platinum. On the Pacific coast, Ecuador 
produced cinchona bark, kapok, and rubber. Paraguay offered prospects 
for substantial amounts of tanning materials. Peru could provide 
cinchona bark, copper, rubber, tungsten, and vanadium. Uruguay could 
mainly contribute wool~ Venezuela produced quantities of petroleum 
and tanning materials.10 Of the thirty-four strategic and critical 
materials, the South American countries could provide varying amounts 
9u.s., Congress, House of Representatives, Strategic and Critical 
Materials, H. Rep. 982, 77th Cong., 1st sess., 1941, PP• 14-15. 
1~ary s. Hessel, et al., Strategic Materials in Hemis~heric De-
fense (New York: Hastings House, Publishers, 1942"};" P• 15 • 
of over two-thirds of the products. In this way, the southern neigh-
bors of the United States could make their most significant contribu-
tion to victory in World War II• 
To tap these essential resources, the United States concluded 
bilateral procurement contracts by which the United States would pur-
chase all of the production of a given material of a particular 
country. Although over forty ,dif.:Eerent North American governmental 
agencies were involved in contracting for these raw resources, the 
three major organizations were the Metals Reserve Company for 
purchasing mineral resources, the Commodity Credit Corporation for 
buying essential or surplus commodities, andUthe Rlllbbe1" RBsertve Company 
for securing raw rubber,11 The tenns of the purchase agreements 
differed widely, but they generally expressed the desire of the South 
American government to participate in hemispheric defense and to 
waive any local requirements which might hinder production,12 The 
contracts provid,ed for the shipment of the raw materials to the 
United States--a key to the concept of economic dependency. 
While the pacts covered many raw resources, rubber became an 
overriding concern. Before Pearl Harbor, more than ninety-five per 
cent of the crude rubber used in the United States had come from 
British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and surrounding islands.13 
In early 1942, these areas had fallen into Japanese control. The only 
major area that could provide this needed material was the Amazon 
11 Sen. Doc, 1.32, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 194.3, PP• 49-50. 
1~echam, United States ~.Inter-American Securi~;y, P• 2,38. 
13 H. Rep. 982, 77th Cong., 1st sess., 1941, P• 18. 
region, which had two centuries earlier provided the :rubber. plan-
tations of Southeast Asia with their first seeds. Latin America, 
however, had virtually ceased conunercial production of :rubber, 
despite the wild rubber trees still growi.ng in the Amazon area. 
a4 
To tap this source, the United States negotiated with Bolivia, Brazil; 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. Dtµ>ing the spring and summer 
of 1942, these six countries signed purchase pacts by which they 
agreed to collect the wild :rubber and sell the entire production to 
the United States. 
With the signing of these rubber pacts, the United States had 
concluded more bilateral procurement contracts for rubber than for 
any other resource. Since the United States began bargaining for 
other materials before Pearl Harbor, the North American :republic could 
utilize the experience of these negotiations in completing the :rubber, 
contracts. Finally, the United States e.fi'ort to obtain rubber fol-
lowed the Japanese victories in Southeast Asia and. thus falle con ... 
veniently into the period f':rom Pearl Harbor to the invasioh of North 
Africa. For these reasons, the rubber contracts can serve as an 
example of the full methodology and impact of the United States pro-
curement policies during 1942. 
In January, 1942, the process for obtaining wild rubber from 
Latin American began with Brazil, the country which offered the 
brightest prospects for production. On March 3, the Rubber Reserve 
Company signed an agreement with Brazil whereby the United States 
would and could buy for a five-year period all the CX'l.lde rubber which 
Brazil did not require for its domestic use. The price was thirty-
nine ·cents per pound for Brazil's most conunon type and price differ-
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entials for other types. Furthennore, the United States would pay 
bonuses of two and one-half cents per pound for all rubber in excess 
of five thousand tons and five cents per pound in excess of ten 
thousand tons. These premiums would come from a $5 million fund which 
the United States provided. This fund would also be the source of 
·subsidies and loans that would support uneconomical projects which 
could increase the production of rubber.14 The loans and subsidies, 
consequently, had the expressed purpose of encouraging the production 
of raw materials. 
The agreement with Brazil provided the basis for future agree-
ments with Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. In the 
third week of March, North American diplomats received instructions to 
propose purchase agreements for rubber. The United States offered 
five-year pacts to purchase all rubber in excess of the country's 
domestic consumption, provide bonuses for amounts of rubber above a 
set minimum, and establish a fund for loans and subsidies •15 The 
proposed agreements required that the Latin American governments 
"agree ••• to curtail rubber manufacturing as soon as possi~le. 1116 
The United States, therefore, wished that the Latin, American govern-
ments increase their production of crude rubber and decrease their 
manufacturing of this raw material. As a result, the South American 
14u .So, Department of State, Project :!;:,g, Increase the Production £!. 
Rubber E, Brazil, Executive Agreement Series No, 371 (March 3, · 1942), 
P• lo 
15Foreign Relations, ~' for Bolivia see V, 560-561; for 
Colombia, see VI, 170...lTL; for Ecuador see VI, .392, 399; for Peru 
see VI, 365-366; for Vepezuela see VI, 665-666. 
16This quote comes from the instructions seI).t to La Paz. Ibid., 
v' 560. . 
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countries would be more economically 13ubservient to their northern 
neighbor .. 
As negotiations were proceeding with these countries, problems 
developed with Brazil over the agreement concluded on March 3. Arguing 
that the rubber being used was part of Brazilian domestic consumption, 
Brazilian. manufacturers had increased their production of tires for 
export to other Latin American countries. To resolve this problem, 
the United States and Brazil amended on May l the original contract to 
' establish a 10,000 ton quota for domestic manufacturing. This limi-
tation of a certain tonnage each year would compel Brazil to utilize 
this quota in producing only essential rubber items.17 The new am~d-
ment thus had the explicit restriction of 10,000 tons each ye~r which 
implied a qualitative restriction on manufacturing only essential 
rubber items. 
This addition of May 1 also provided that twenty-five per cent 
of the tonnage quota was for export to other Latin American countries. 
Brazil, however, wanted to export these manufactures directly in order 
to increase its Latin American trade. Since the agreements provided 
that the Rubber Re13erve had a monopoly over all rubber available for 
export, the United States governrrental agency wanted to export these 
Brazilian rubber products through its own organization. In October, 
1942, the two nations reached a compromise. The United States would 
determine the amount of tires which the Latin American countries were 
to receive, and Brazil could supply a number of these through normal 
trade channels.18 In return for following the United States quota 
system and restricting its manufactures, Bra2iil received a fifteen 
per cent increase on the price which the United States paid for its 
rubber.19 The United States agreements with Brazil thus had the 
effects of encouraging the production of raw materials, discouraging 
the manufacture of goods, and controlling the exports of Brazil. 
BY the summer of 1942, the negotiations with the other Latin 
American countries were completed. All the countries received a 
fifteen per cent increase over the price which the United States had 
originally proposed in March. This increase was in, part a United 
States reaction to Arge.ntina' s· offers to its sister republics to buy 
their rubber at an amount higher than the United States first offer. 
The Argentine proposed price of at least fifty cents per pound was 
superceded by the United States combination of increasing the price, 
premiums, subf?id.ies, and loans. 20 Through these monetary expenditures, 
21 the United States paid eightY""two cents per pound for rubber. · When 
this figure is compared to the prewar price of six oe.:nts per pound 
!or rubber, 22 little ~oubt is left as to why the Latin American 
countries granted the United States government the purchase contracts. 
Some South American countries, such as Peru and Colombia, 
requested that the United States allocate machinery necessary to the 
18Ib.d 
J. • ' PP• 708-709, 719. 
19Ibid.' VI, 181, 
20!bid., PP• 182, 18'7, 396-399. 
21 Sen. Doc. 132, 78th Cong., 1st sess,, 1943, P• 119, 
22 Ibid., P• 51. 
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development of rubber manufactur:i,ng plants. In rejecting the Colombian 
proposal, Cordell Hull summarized the American policy: "The construe-
tion of a tire pl.ant • • , is impossible at the present time, ln many 
of the American republics such projects have been put forward and the 
policy of the Department has been uniformal].y against them. • • "" 23 
When this policy is added to the reason that he gave for terminating 
negotiations with Chile, namely because no "likelihood of securing 
••• substantial amounts of rubber which would.not otherwise be 
available, 1124 the overall purpose o.f Am:lr:Lcan pol.icy emerges. The 
goal of the North American country wae to encourage the production 
of raw· rubber and discourage the production of manufactured rubber. 
The South American governments accepted these goals when they gave the 
United States a purchase monopoly over the crude matel'i~s in exchange 
for a better than 1300 per cent increase in the prewar price of crude 
rubber. 
With the s:Lgning of these contracts, the United States achieved 
a rubber monopoly in the Western Hemisphere. This privileged position 
allowed the United States to determine unilaterally the rationing o.f 
manufactured rubber products which it announced on May 6, 1942. 25 
This power over the amount of rubber which a given South American 
country could consume increased the economic dependency of South 
America. 
In another area of economic cooperation, the Export-Import Bank 
23Foreign R.elations, ~' VI, 16. 
24rbid.' 74. 
25Ibid~, v. 702. 
of the United States government ostensibly had the generous function of 
aiding Latin American agricultural and industrial development to pro-
mote economic and political· stability. 26 This governmental agency was 
the main source of financial assistance from the United States to the 
Latin American governments, Z'1 as it issued over $80 million in credits 
to those countries in 1942. 28 In the actual practice of granting 
credits to Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay, the 
Eximbank's purpose to aid.foreign economic growth lost its altruism. 
Regarding Brazil, the United States signed on March 3 a bilateral 
pact for the general mobilization of resources with loans from the 
Export-Import Bank, In granting $100 million credit in United States 
goods and services, the North American republic sought to increase the 
production of several. raw materials, including burlap, ipecac, rete-
none, silk, babassu nuts, hides, and wool-all of which played an 
important role in the American war effort. More important than any of 
these items, however, was steel, The purpose of most of the money 
was to enable the Brazilian government to open the Itabira mines and 
to improve the railroad facilities from the mines to the port of 
Vitcfria. This aid would remedy the lack of capital and rail facilities 
which had prevented the largest deposit of low phosphorous iron and 
manganese ore in the world from being commercially productive, The 
plan also called for the exportation of the iron ore to the United 
26Gardrier Patterson, ''The Export-Import Bank," Quarterly Review 
2f. Economics, 1'VIII (November, 1943), 88. · · .· 
27 Guerrant, goosevel t' s . Good Neighbor Policy, p. 200. 
28wythe, "Ind,ustry, Commerce, and Finance," P• 63. 
States for processing into iron and steel goods.29 On March 3rd, the 
United States and Brazil had entered into three major agreements-a 
Lend-Lease Pact, a :rubber contract, and an Eximbank credit agreement, 
The latter two had the specific purpose of developing the Bra~ilian 
sources of raw materials which the United States would use in its 
own domestic manufacturing. 
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A similar result occurred through the Export-Import Bank credit to 
Ecuador and Bolivia. The assistance to Ecuador, which Sumner Welles 
had promised at Rio in return for Ecuador's settlement of the dispute 
with Peru, went to the Ecuadorian Development Corporation. Besides 
the rehabilitation of the war-torn El Oro province, the governmental 
agency had as a major aim the increased production of :rubber, vege-
table oils, fibers, and drugs. All of these raw materials would supply 
the United States defense industries which would transform them into 
consumable items. Like the credit to Ecuador, the loan of $15.5 
million to Bolivia was also an outgrowth of the Rio conference. The 
Bolivian Development Corporation, which received the credit, concen-
trated on the lowlands in eastern Bolivia, In trying to improve trans-
portation and communication and to develop mining, agricultural, and 
petroleum production, the Bolivian corporation attempted to provide 
larger amounts of raw materials to United States industry.JO These 
credits to Ecuador and Bolivia, like those to Brazil, had the purpose 
of improving the sources of raw materials for North American industry. 
In 1942, the Export-Import Bank granted additional loans to 
29Foreign Relations, ~' V, PP• 678-684. 
30Guerrant, Roosevelt's 922.£Neighbor Policy, P• 20lo 
91 
Uruguay and Paraguay. The main reason for the Uruguayan loan was the 
severe economic dislocation the war had created. With high unemploy-
ment and social unrest, the government of Alfredo Baldomir requested 
a credit of $30 million for public works. Since much of the request 
depended upon such materials, as iron and steel, Uruguay reduced its 
request to $7.5 million for the construction of roads which would use 
only a limited quantity of highly needed materials. By providing con-
struction jobs, the loan would relieve the rising unemployment and 
arrest the growing internal fennent. The State Department recommended 
that the Eximbank grant the loan because of "the leadership which the 
Uruguayan Government has displayed in connection with hemispheric 
matters" and in particular with the Committee for Political Defense. 31 
A credit of $3 million to Paraguay alleviated doubts in Asuncio'n con~ 
cerning the sincerity of United States friendship and the belief 
there that Paraguay's "lack of key materials accounts for the relative 
lack of interest of Washington in her problems. 1132 With this money, 
Paraguay was planning to construct port and river works, cold storage 
equipment, and highways. 33 The ulterior motive behind these two 
loans was to keep the cooperation of two South American govel'n!llents. 
Although the original function of the Export-Import Bank was to 
aid the development of Latin American economies, the loans tendered 
in 1942 were not for such purely generous reasons. The loans to 
Brazil, Ecuador, and Bolivia were designed to augment the production 
3lForeign Relations, ~' VI, PP• 716-729. 
32Ibid., P• 655. 
33Foreign Relations, 1~41, VII, p. 492. 
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of raw materials for use by North American industry and to bind more 
tightly the economic ties of these countries to the United States, 
The loans to Uruguay and Paraguay were for the maintenance of friend-
ship: a reward for Uruguay's past cooperation and a token demonstra-
tion of the United States friendship for Paraguay. This latter use of 
United States funds is applicable to other forms of grants to Latin 
America. As Secretary of Commerce Jesse Jones, who was in charge of 
the procurement program, llelilarked concerning the subsidies which the 
United States granted to spur production of given item, ''Occasionally 
a subsidy was arranged to do a diplomatic favor for the State Depart-
ment in cultivating friends •••• 1134 The United States thus violated 
the expressed intent of the Export-Import Bank and utilized it to 
advance the economic dependency of Latin America and to insure the 
continued cooperation of the governments. 
Coupled with the Export-Import Bank loans, the United States also 
advanced money to improve the health and sanitary conditions in South 
America. In addition to thirty major hospitals and nearly two 
hundred health centers, the United States also completed or planned 
improvements in water supply systems, sewers, drainage systems, 
slaughter houses and marketplaces, health education, and health care. 35 
Before the Rio meeting, Sumner Welles had announced that the United 
States was willing 11to participate in and to encourage complementary 
agr~ements among the American republics for dealing with these problems 
34Jesse H. Jones and Edward Angly, ~ftl Billion Dollars: 
Thirteen ~s With ~ RFC (1922-1945) New York: Macmillan, 
po 351. 
35 6 Sen. Doc. 132, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 1943, PP• 7, 72. 
~ 
1951), 
of health and sanitation by provision • • • of funds, raw materials, 
and services. 1136 ln doing so, Brig. Gent George c. Durham, Director 
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of the United States program, concluded that ''in making these services, 
skills, and facilities available to our Latin American neighbors, •• 
• • [the United States] is giving living reality to the Good Neighbor 
Policy of trying to advance the Latin American nations, 1137 The 
United States, therefore, was claiming that humanitarian ideals moti-
vated the health and sanitation program. 
A brief analysis of the individual health, programs with Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru will remove this cloak 
of humanitarianism. 38 The agreement with Bolivia required the United 
States to send technical experts to Bolivia to assist in the develop-
ing of disease controls and environmental sanitation. 39 Since these 
technicians were assigned to areas that produced antimony, cinchona 
bark, copper, tin, tungsten, and rubber, the purpose of developing 
the health of Bolivia waf? to improve the conditions of the regions 
that produced vital raw materials. While the Brazil,ian program in-
eluded health protection for the workers constructing the railroad 
that would serve the Itabira mines, 40 the actual contract specified 
36world Peace Foundation, Documents, IV, 285. 
37 George c. Durham, "The Inter-American Health and Sanitation 
Program," Inter-American Affairs; An Annual Survey, I (1942), 162. 
38The United States did not conclude a health and sanitation 
agreement with Argentina, Chile or Uruguay. 
39u .s., Department of State, Health and Sanitation Proeiram: 
Bolivia, Executive Agreement Series No. 300 (July 15, and 16, 1942), 
P• 2. 
40Durham, "The Inter-American Health and Sanitation Program," 
P• 157. 
that the "program would be initially designed for the Amazon Basin 
area for the special purpose of aiding the stimulation of rubber 
production. 1141 The United States used these exact words in its 
agreement with Peru. 4~ The Colombian contract deviated from this 
wording in an explicit reference to the rubber agreement signed 
earlier. The United States also pledged to aid in the nutritional 
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and sanitation program of the key ports of Colombia, the areas where 
the United States had stationed American soldiers.43 The pact with 
Ecuador specified that the program concentrate on Quito and Guayaquil, 
again areas in which large numbers of North Americans lived.44 After 
the United States secured vhe naval station at Salinas, the North 
American government began investigating the expansion of the program 
to include this area.45 In the same vein, the United States granted 
a health and sanitation contract to Paraguay for the Asunsid"n area, 
the only location in which United States nationals lived. This con-
tract, like the Export-Import Bank loan, was a token gesture of North 
American friendship so that the Paraguayans would not consider them-
selves neglected by the United States.46 The humanitarian reasons 
4lu.s .. , Department of State, Health and Sanitation Pro~ram: 
Brazil, Executive Agreement Series No. 372 (March 14, 1942 , p. 1. 
42u.se, Department of State, Health .2E& Sanitation Program: Peru, 
Executive Agreement Series No. 441 {May 9 and 11, 1942), p. 1. 
43u.s., Department of State, Health and Sanitation Program: Colom-
bia, Executive Agreement Series No. 369 (October 23, 1942), pp. 1-20 
44u .s. , Departme.nt of State, Health and Sanitation Pro,ram: Ecua-
dor, Executive Agreement Series No. 379 (February 24, 1942 , pp. l='2o 
45Foreysn Relations, ~' VI, 389. 
46Ibid., po 657 • 
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fade as two other reasons emerge. The health programs in the various 
countries were sponsored to protect the health of North American 
nationals living in South America. Secondly, the projects also were 
established to make health conditions of the areas which provided raw 
materials for the North American war machinery conducive to the produc-
tion of those materials. 
Unlike the cooperative sanitation program which began after Pearl 
Harbor, the United States use of the blacklist had begun before the 
war. According to the announcement of the Proclaimed List of Blocked 
-,.::- :N·atl:on8.;ls.printed in July, 1941, no individual or business under the 
authority of the United States could have financial deal;i,ngs with any 
person or company whose name appeared on the list as being Axis domi-
nated or controlled. Furthermore, anyone who had business with a 
blacklisted firm was liable to inclusion on the list. The decision 
on the content of the list was totally'.in'the hands of the United States 
government which would decide from its own intelligence whether the 
Axis dominated a particular enterprise.47 Inclusion upon the list 
would force an economic boycott of a given individual and could result 
in the failure of the listed businessman. The South American countries 
objected to the non-consultative method by which the United States 
derived the content of the list since it could mean the failure of a 
corporation which was vital to the economy of a South American 
countrye 48 During the prewar period, the United States refused to 
47See the lengthy circular letter to the American diplomats in 
Latin America outlining the procedures and policies of the Proclaimed 
List. Foreign Relations, l.2£_, VI, 271-285. 
48Ruiz Guil'laz't!, ~ Pol(tica Argentina, PP• 133-136 • 
. ~ . .'-"· 
accept this rationale and continued to deny the cooperative spirit of 
the Good Neighbor. 
The advent of war in December, 1941, compelled the United States 
to initiate a new procedure regarding the blacklis.t",, BY' the -.end of 
January, the United States ~reed to consult with the Latin American 
countries which had cieclared war or had broken diplomatic ;relations 
with the Tripartite powers.49 The final decision, however, lay with 
the United States. The United States also maintained two lists, one 
public and one confidential, SO If' the South American country balked 
at the inclusion of a particular business on the Proclaimed List, 
96 
the northern neighbor could place the suspect on the confidential list 
and thus deny him shipments of goods. In addition, the United States 
couJ.d privately inform its businessmen that they should not deal with 
the questionable individual f'i:nn. While the United States ostensibly 
granted the privil.ege .of consulting to the eight countries of South 
America that had declared war or had severed diplomatic relations with 
the Axis, in effect, it was still pursuing its prewar policy of non-
consultation and non-cooperation, 
While the non-consultative policy created problems, the operation 
of the blacklist in South America caused even more difficulties. The 
blacklisted individuals included some of the most influential South 
Americans, such as the brother-in-law of Colombia's president. 5l The 
United States also listed the company in which the son of the Argentine 
49Foreigp Relations, ~' V, 2S5-2S6 .. 
50Ibid,, P• 291. 
5lJohn A. Sylvester, Arthur Bliss Lane: American g6rjer Diplomat 
(unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 19 7 , p. 106. 
president held a large interest because a member of the board of 
directors had been born in ltaly. 52 To prevent the disruption of the 
South American economies when listed firms ceased their operations, 
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the United States arranged in many cases to have American corporations 
provide substitute services. This is especially true when various 
subsidiaries of Pan American Airlines assumed throughout South America 
comparable routes to those of German and Italian airlines. Once the 
American businesses had begun their operations, the United States could 
force the proclaimed competitors to cease operations by prohibiting 
North American firms from supplying them with necessary services and 
equipment.. As in the case of the airlines, United States oil companies 
followed the orders of their government and refused to deliver avia-
tion fuel to the Axis airlines. 53 In substituting United States 
monopolies for Axis ones, the United States enlarged its economic 
control over the South American states. The North American republic 
began paying to Pan American Airline:s subsidies :similar to the ones 
the South American governments had given to the Axis-dominated firms. 
For example, the Roosevelt administration assumed the responsibility 
for a monthly grant of $16,000 to Lloyd AEfreo Boliviano once United 
States control had replaced the German ownership. 54 This process 
helped the South American governments accept what a Bolivian writer 
called the "aerial expansionism of the Yankees. 1155 Enlarging the 
52Foreign Relations, ~' V, 438. 
53Jones, Fifty Billion Dollars, PP• 367-368. 
54Sen. DOc,, 132, ?8th Cong., 1st sess., 1943, P• .101 •. 
. . 
55The· ~te is from Fern~do Die~ de Medina as quot~d in Carleton 
Beals, "Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia," in~~ South Americans Think 
£!Us, P•" 36. , ., . ., 
dominance of the United States corporations and blacklisting import-
ant South Americans were not the only irritating by-products of the 
Proclaimed List. 
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The military and financial assistance which the United States was 
rendering to the South American countries could be forceful tools to 
persuade the various Latin American governments to cooperate even 
further in the implementation of the blacklist. For example, the 
United States informed the Bolivian government that a loan to stabilize 
Bolivian currency was contingent u~on the Bolivian national bank; ceas-
ing its operations with blacklisted individuals. 56 In Ecuador, the 
Development Corporation funds from the Export-Import Bank were to be 
expended to eliminate the continued functioning of Proclaimed List 
nationals from the econond,c life of Ecuador.57 ~his use of economic 
might, the inclusion of prominent South Americans, and the expansion 
of North American corporations into Latin America help expla:in South 
American dislike of the blacklist. 
Because of these problems, the South American governments had 
little enthusiasm for the policies and operations of the Proclaimed 
Listo Even the closest ally of the United States, Brazil, was unhappy 
with the North AmericEµJ. creation. Its highly cooperative Foreign 
Minister, Oswaldo Aranha, denounced the list in private conversations 
with American diplomats. In the days preceding the Rio conference, he 
tried to secure the cooperation of the Latin American goverr:mients to 
56Foreign Relations, 1942, V, 619. 
57Ibid,, PP• 423-425. 
pass a resolution urging the modification of the Proclaimed List.58 
With such a negative reaction f~m an otherwise friendly country, the 
United States omitted the controversial publication from the Economic 
and Financial Conference in order to avoid an attack upon the list. 59 
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While the southern neighbors of the United Statee disliked the program, 
they still cooperated with it because of the economic power of the 
United States. 
Du.ring 1942, the United States continued its practice of signing 
reciprocal trade agreements by completing a tariff-lowering pact with 
Peru. The principal produ,cts on which Peru granted concessions to the 
United States were automobiles, trucks, automotive parts, business 
machines, and processed foods. 60 Of a total of fifty items, forty-one 
were manufactured goods. 61 The main reductions in the United States 
tariff schedules to the benefit of Pe-ru were on sugt;1.r, long-staple 
cotton, animal hair, bismuth, and coca leaves. 62 All thirty-eeven 
articles were raw materials. 63 An example of the reciprocal con-
cessions was the United States agreement to reduce tariffs on cinchona 
bark, while Peru reduced the tariffs for pharmec·euticals. The major 
items on which the United States reduced its dutiee were articles 
5~ower.s,. Chile Through Embass;v Windows, p. 63. 
59Foreign Relations, ~' V, 69, 
6°u. s., Department of State, Dep§.tlment 2.t St§.te Bul1etin, Vol. VI, 
no. 150 (May 9, 1942), P• 411~ Hereafter cited as "Trade Agreement 
with Peru,," Department of State Bulletin. 
61uos~, Department of State, R.ec)rocal Trade: ~' Executive 
Agreement Series No. 256 (May 7, 1942 , pp. 1S:23. 
6211Trade Agreement with Peru," Department 2! State Bulletin, P• 413, 
63R.eciprocal Trade: Peru, Executive Agreement Series No. 256, 
PP• 24-31, . -
needed in the war industries. Long-staple cotton, which comprised 
only a small percentage of United States domestic cotton production, 
had the important characteristics of uniformity, roughness, and 
tensile strength which made it usable in manufacturing asbestos and 
strong fabrics~ 64 The trade agreement basically allowed reductions 
in Peruvian duties on manufactured goods and on United States duties 
on raw materials. 
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A similar situation, although to a lesser extent, existed in the 
reciprocal tariff pact the United States signed with Uruguay. The 
major articles upon which Uruguay reduced its import taxes were agri-
cultural and industrial items, such as fruits, nuts, canned fish, 
tobacco products, automobiles, automobile parts, radio equipment, 
refrigeration machinery, agricultural and industrial machinery, 
business equipment, lumber, aeronautical apparatus, chemical products, 
and motion picture film. 65 Of US items, n1ne.ty....,f.ou.r· conce.rned 
manufactured articles. 66 The United States reduced its duties on 
sixteen items including flaxseed, canned corned beef, casein, hides, 
particular types of coarse wools, tallow, ole0 oil, glycerin, unmanu-
factured agates, dried blood, crude and processed bones, tankage, 
and sausage casings. 67 Although these concessions were on Uruguay's 
6411Trade Agreement with Peru," Uepartment2£ State Bulletin, pi -U4o 
no •. ~~~~1~ieA~1~2~ryi~l~~t*i~~~~~!~:t~~a:~. VII' 
Agreement with Uruguay," Department £!State Bulletin. 
66u.s., Department of State, Reciprocal Trade; Uruguay, Executive 
Agreement Series N.o. 276 (July 21, 1942), pp. 20-39. These figures 
may be misleading to the extent that automobile parts are listed 
individually. 
6711Trade Agreement with Uruguay, 11 Department £! State Bulletin, 
P• 654e. 
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principal products of sheep and cattle, many of these reductions were 
on agricultural products which were useful in the war effort~ 68 
While the mutual tariff concessions between the United States and 
Uruguay in agricultural products reflected a true reciprocal trade, 
the United States received from both Peru and Uruguay major reductions 
on manufactured items, and the Latin American countries received major 
reductions on agricultural and raw materials. The agreements were 
designed to maintain the United States as the principal purchaser of 
raw materials which the underdeveloped countries produced. Rather 
than develop new areas of trade, the agreements encouraged <;inly the 
existing trade routes ,which had kept the United States in the 
economically dominant po13itio~, The North American country also gave 
concessions to materials which were important to its war effort. For 
these two reasons, the agreements, which were to be reciprocal, 
favored the United States. 
The overall purpose of the various aspects of the United States 
bilateral economic relationships with the South American republics was 
the fostering of the production of raw materials. The purchase con-
tracts which the United States signed for a multitude of essential 
items had the purpose of encouraging the production of those items. 
The seemingly generous Export-Import Bank loans and the health and 
sanitation programs also had this same function. The reciprocal trade 
program during 1942 lowered the tariff walls in another effort to 
increase the amount of raw materials heading north from South America. 
By the definition of an economic satellite, this shipment of raw 
68Reciprocal Trade: U;ruguay, Executive Agreement Series No. 
276, PP• 50-55. 
materials to the industrial center for conversion into finished 
products represents one aspect of the relationship. 
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The United States exported the raw materials back to Latin America 
as manufactured products. After the United States war industry 
transfonned the raw materials into defensive supplies, the South Ameri-
can governments received the finished products as part of inter-Ameri-
can defensive collaboration. Regarding non-military exports to La.tin 
America, the United States sent machinery, chemicals, and iron and 
steel products which North American industry had manufactured in part 
from Latin American resources. Finally, the war had interrupted the 
supply of European manufactured goods for South America. Only the 
United States could fill the economic vacuum. In doing so, the United 
States naturally used Latin American raw materials in ever increasing 
quantities. The United States was sending back to the Latin American 
countries their raw materials in finished fonn, which completes the 
circuit necessary for an economic subserviency. 
The economic control which the United States exercised added to 
this dependency. The unilateral decisions regarding trade placed 
tremendous power in the hands of the United States government. The 
Proclaimed List policies further entrenched control by giving the 
United States a method of eliminating Axis-dominated competition. 
While explicitly concerned with external trade, the blacklist also 
involved the internal trade of the various South American countries. 
This near economic omnipotence added i1esh to the skeleton of economic 
subserviency. 
The South American governments accepted this status because of 
immediate financial incentives provided by each program. The unilateral 
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trade regulations had the purpose of insuring the economic stability 
of the South American countries. The raw materials brought prices 
higher than those of prewar days. Although the Eximbank: loans were 
to develop the areas that produced raw materials, and the health and 
sanitation programs applied to the same regions, the South American 
countries benefited by having these programs aid at least a portion 
of their territory. The reciprocal agreements provided the immediate 
advantage of lowering United States tariffs on raw materials necessary 
to the war effort. These immediate financial rewards encouraged the 
South American governments to accept United States dominance in the 
program of economic cooperation. 
While the South American countries were economic satellites before 
the war, the word 'increased' is key to the wartime economic subservi-
ency. During 1942, the production of raw materials increased. The 
dependence upon United States manufactured articles increased. The 
amount of United States control increased. The economic dependency 
of South America, therefore, increased as a direct result of the 
economic cooperation which the United States pursued during the first 
year of World War II. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding chapters have analyzed how the United States used 
economic power to secure the political, defensive, and economic 
cooperation of the South American governments. At the Rio conference, 
Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles persuaded eight of the South 
American republics to sever diplomatic relations with the Axis. In 
return for this departure from neutrality, the North American diplomat 
promised economic aid. Despite offers and sanctions of an economic 
nature, the United States had not brought the two recalcitrant repub-
lics into a cooperative attitude by the end of 1942. Lend-Lease 
assistance formed the basis of the defensive cooperation by which the 
South American governments granted concessions to the United States. 
Economic cooperation mainly concerned procuring raw materials from 
individual South Arrerican countries on the basis of bilateral agree-
ments. These political, defensive, and economic relations involved 
government-to-government programs. 
In addition to governmental cooperation, many of these programs 
also had the aim of gaining the friendship of the South American 
people. The Office of the Co-ordinator of Inter-American Affairs 
(CIAA), headed by Nelson A. Rockereller, directed these dual-purpose 
programs, such as the Export .... Import Bank projects and the health and 
sanitation efforts. Many of the development programs, however, 'm;lre 
, ('\}, 
not completed because of the priority system for shipping of needed 
materials. Some health projects, such as drainage ditches, rapidly 
deteriorated through inattention.1 While the offers and initial 
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efforts of the programs could gain the coll~boration of the government, 
the final result did not gain the friendship of tpe people whom the 
projects were designed to help. 
Relating directly to winning the loyalty of the South American 
people, the CIAA also managed the propaganda efforts of the United 
States goverruoont. In its use of motion pictures as propaganda 
vehicles, the CIAA sent two types of films to South America: Holly-
wood's theatrical presentations and the government's non-theatrical 
productions. 2 The main audiences for these motion pictures were in 
the urban centers since the films were rarely available for ~hewing in 
distant rural areas. 3 In the towns and cities, the Sol.1th American 
people enjoyed the Hollywood productions. Although entertaining, these 
films failed to develop closer ties between North and South Americans 
because the emphasis upon divorce, crime, affluency, and violence dis-
torted North American life and culture. Most of the productions by 
the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-Airerican Affairs were poorly 
attendedo Only 1.5 million Latin Americans viewed these presentations 
during 1942. Understandably, the South Americans were less than en-
thusiastic over such cinematic treasl.lres as "Autobiography of a Jeep," 
1Sen. Doc. 132, 7B-th Cong., 1st sess., 1943, P• 48. 
2u .s., Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, 
Summary£!. Activities, August 16, 1944, p. 3. Hereafter cited as 
CIAA, Summary. 
3Beals, "Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia," in ~ the South Americans 
Think £!. Us, P• 23. 
"Building a Bomber," "Your Air Raid Warden," "Army Tank Destroyers," 
"FBI Front," "Eyes of the Navy," and "A Ship is Born."4 The United 
States-sponsored radio programs matched this failure to capture the 
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minds of the Latin Americans. Besides broadcasting in a continental 
Castil:i..an Spanish accent, the radio programs were designed by North 
Americans with little appeal for the Latin American mind. 5 For these 
reasons, the propaganda efforts in motion pictures and radio failed to 
win friends for the United Stateso 
The United States also did not influence people through the 
propaganda presso The major effort of the CIAA was a slick publica-
tion entitled~ Guardia. With a format similar to Life magazine, the 
publication stressed the United States wa,r effort at home and abroad, 
giving only little attention to the roie of the Latin American states. 
Over ninety per cent of the published material concerned war activities 
which were totally:North American,,.6 With this emphasis on military 
might r$SUJ?~~cting the ghost of the Coloso del Norte, the United States 
was indeed fortunate in having a readership limited to only the upper 
classes and officialdom. Articie after article praising the vast 
production of military supplies, at first glance, contradicted the 
North American claims to the South American governments that the United 
States did not have war materials to send to themo Also the accounts 
of the 600 per cent increase in shipping facilities seemed to belie the 
4cIAA, Summary, PP• 3-4. 
~ah~el Seoane, "If I Were Nelson Rockefeller," trans e by Lloyd 
Mallan, Harper's Magazine, CLXXXV' (February, 1943), 3169 
6This percentage is based upon a reading of the first eighteen 
issues of En. Guardia from August, 1941 (Vol .. I, no .. 1) to December, 
1942 (Vol. II, no. 5). . ·· 
United States claim that a shipping shortage was preventing the trans-
fer of needed supplies to the South American countries. This lavishly 
printed magazine had a circulation of 200,000 issues by the end of 
19410 7 According to the figures of Manuel Seoane, the editor of 
Chile's Ercilla magazine, the expensive ivory stock of~ Guardia cost 
as much as the paper for 2.5 million copies of South American magazines 
and newspapers. The United States was able to find shipping priority 
for the issues of ~ Guardia, but was unable to obtain the same for 
newsprint going to many pro-Allied Latin American publications. 
En Guardia made the same mistake as the news releases and feature 
stories sent to the native journals of South America in that identical 
material was sent throughout Latin America without any consideration 
for the diversity of nations and regions.B The United States printed 
matter, therefore, joined with the motion pictures and radio in making 
the entire propaganda push singularly inept. 
With such poor results on the propaganda front, the embassies in 
South America agreed that the exchange program was the most valuable 
effort to gain close relationships.9 The war, however, interrupted 
the student exchange program as the number of Latin American students 
enrolled in North American colleges declined during 1942. Near the 
end of the year, the State Department announced the suspension of grants 
to aid North American students going to Latin America. The basis for 
7nozer, Are We Good Neighbors?, p. 116. 
B Seoane, "If I Were Nelson Rockefeller," PP• 313-3150 
9Herschel Brickell, ''Venezuela and Colombia," in What ~ South 
Americans Think 2f ~' P• 235. 
this move was to permit the young people full participation in the 
direct war effort.10 Other exchange programs regarding journalists, 
business leaders, military personnel, governmental officials, and 
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scholars suffered to a lesser degree due to the wartime reqµirements. 
The grants for visits to the United States became political plums 
awarded for influential connections rather than merito11 With such 
methods, the exchange program failed to gain the United States friends 
with the bulk of the people of South America. 
While the educational and propaganda program neither hindered nor 
helped in gaining friends, the by-products of the United States politi-
cal, military, and economic relations with the South American govern-
ments alienated large segments of the South American populace. These 
programs sent large numbers of American citizens to live in Latin 
American countries. This meeting of North Americans and South Ameri-
cans be came a confrontation between conflicting cultures o The :~N-oxth 
American's attitude oi economic, social, intellectual, religious, and 
cultural superiority12 manifested itself most acutely in racial preju-
dice against the South Americans who had a high degree of African 
parentage.13 To reinforce this belief of superiority, the North Ameri-
cans desired a high standard of living which their large incomes, 
lOWilliam Rex Crawford, "Cultural Relations," Inter-American 
Affairs: Ag Annual Survey, I (1942), PP• 104-105, llB. 
11:seals, "Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia," in What the South Americans 
-----Think of Us, P• 69. 
--
1 2washington, Brazil, P• 9., 
1301iver, "Brazil and Uruguay," in What the South Americans Think 
--~of~' po 95. 
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relative to the South American's, could buy.14 This attitude of 
superiority incurred the enmity of the people with whom the North 
Americans came into contact. 
Another result of the presence of large numbers of United States 
citizens was the inflation which buying better goods and services for 
higher prices helped to cause. The reduction in the avai,lability of 
consumer goods due to war rationing and shipping priorities compounded 
the rise in the cost of living. Furthermore, as the United States 
paid more money for raw materials, the South Americans had more money 
with which to purchase consumer items. For these reasons, the price 
index in La Paz jumped 1400 per cent from the mid ~930 1 s. 15 In Chile, 
the rate of inflation increased more than eighty per cent from 1940 to 
1942.16 With the by-product of inflation, the South Americans were 
understandably irx-itated with the American presence in Latin America. 
The total Roosevelt policy toward Latin America failed to win . 
friends and even lost some. The most tangible result of the policy 
which the United States followed during the first year of the war was 
that the governments of the South American countries, with the possible 
exception of Argentina, cooperated with the United States in its war 
effort. Since the cooperation had been bartered for monetary advance-
ment, the conclusion is that the cooperation could be bought, while 
friendship could not. 
Although strong South American nationalists might criticize the 
l4Sen. Doc. 132, ?8th Cong,, lst sess., 1943, P• 40. 
l5Beals' "Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia, II in wnat ~ South Americans 
Think 2! 1!§_, P• Zl • 
16Sen. Doc. 132, ?8th Cong., 1st sess., 1943, P• 39. 
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use of financial.ropes to tow the Latin countries as a cockboat in the 
wake of North America's warship, the Roosevelt administration had little 
choiceo The South American states were vital to the Allied effort. 
Besides the geographically strategic significance of the northeastern 
Brazilian bulge, the Spanish Main countries of Venezuela and Colombia 
could serve as bases either to protect or to destroy the Panama Canal, 
still a vital link in United States maritime transportation. The 
entire southern flank of the United States was South America, and 
good military strategy demanded the protection of all flankso These 
geographical considerations necessitated the cooperation of the South 
American states. 
To say that the United States desperately needed the strategic 
and critical materials from Latin America is an understatement o Axis 
agents operating in Latin America under the cloak of diplomatic repre-
sentatives could endanger these vital shipments of raw materials with 
radio dispatches to waiting German submarineso When the United States 
compelled the manufacture of raw materials in North, not South, 
America, the Roosevelt administration insured that these vital materials 
would be effectively utilized and conserved.17 Furthermoref the types 
of materials required to provide a steel mill or a tire factory were 
the same needed to supply the fighting fronts with tanks, planes, guns, 
ships, and other essential war implements. The Proclaimed List, while 
controversial, was realistic. The Roosevelt administration could not 
permit North American industry to aid the enemy. The methods of its 
policy, hence, were justifiable by the laws of expediency. 
l7Foreign Relations, ~' VI, 1800 
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The United States used economic power to gain the cooperation 
of the South American republics. Less pressure would have been too 
little; more pressure would have been too much. Doing nothing or 
using only friendly persuasion would have probably accomplished far 
less than what was needed. In 1942, the Good Neighbor Policy was, at 
best, less than a dozen years old. The animosities which had grown 
during thirty years of military occupation of various Latin American 
countries did not die in such a short timeo The United States could 
not have sent troops into the Latin American countries to force coopera-
tion because every soldier was needed to battle against A~is aggression. 
An attempt to su,bvert unfriendly governments in the Southern Hemisphere 
would have led to chaos in the sources of raw materials and deep hatred 
among the South American people. Such hatred would have provided the 
seeds of revolution which the Axis powers would have been able to 
nuttureo Consequently, the United States followed the correct middle 
course~friendly persuasion backed by economic rewards and economic 
sartctionso 
Of the South American countries, only Brazil cooperated to its 
fullest extento After declaring war in 1942, the Vargas government 
sent in the following year its troops to fight j,n the European theatero 
At the end of the war, the United States was stationing 165,000 troops 
in Brazil and had flown 1,238 aircraft through Brazilian territoryo 
This collaboration had the price tag of $350 million in Lend-Lease 
.d 18 ai • 
The remaining South American countries cooperated only on a 
18nozer, ~ ~ Good Neighbors?, P• 122. 
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highly limited basis. These republics did not commit their troops to 
active participation in the defense of the hemisphere. The year 194.3 
witnessed only Bolivia assuming a belligerent status. All the other 
countries did not declare war until 1945 when an Allied victory was 
assured.19 The members of the Roosevelt administration agreed in 1942 
to oppose the South American republics' entrance into the war because 
the North American military could not protect them. 20 While it~ true 
that the United States never attempted to have the South American 
countries declare war in 1942, the administration's reasoning is subject 
to serious questioning. Whether or not a state of war existed would 
not and did not interfere with any Axis designs regarding a South 
American country or its shipping. The Roosevelt administration must 
have realized that declarations of war by the South American countries 
was not a possible objective. Since the United States had been unable 
to achieve unanimity upon severance of diplomatic relations, how could 
it have hope to obtain declarations of war from all countries& This 
limited cooperation of the South American countries again demonstrates 
the inadequacy of the "all for one" explanation of the Good Neighbor 
Policye 
The United States relations with South America in 1942 are 
consistent with the policy which the North American country has 
followed throughout the twentieth century. The period of Theodore 
Roosevelt's Big Stick and William Taft's Dollar Diplomacy prepared the 
l 9New York World-Telegram, The World Almanac and Book of Facts for 
~' ed. by Eo Eastman Irvine (New York: New York worlci-Telegram, -
l94l)), ppo 40-42. 
20 ' ' Welles, Seven Decisions, Po 106. 
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basic .fonnat of using military and monetary might. This corrft)ination 
remained the basic procedure through the 1920's. The Good Neighbor 
Policy merely placed added emphasis on the economic h~.f of the two-
edged sword. When the Good Neighbor's governmental dollars replaced 
Dollar Diplomacy's private ones, the economic blade became sharper. 
This use of financial power to buy good relations with South America 
has continued through Harry Truman's Point Four program and John 
Kennedy's Alli;mce for Progress. The military side has never been 
completely dulled. With its inunense military power always in the back-
ground, a mobilized United States honed the blade during World War II. 
When Dwight Eisenhower acted in Guatemala, John Kennedy in the Bay of 
Pigs, and Lyndon Johnson in the Dominican Republic, the United States 
sliced with the military edge of its cut1ai:is. 
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